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RECONSTRUCTING MARRIAGE: AN INTERSEXIONAL
APPROACH
MARTHA M. ERTMAN*
The bundle of power and privileges to which we give the name of
ownership is not constant through the ages. The faggots must be put
together and rebound from time to time.'
INTRODUCTION
Commercialization of heterosexual relations, specifically marriage,
has the potential to further the goals of queer theory by undermining
gender and sexual orientation hierarchies. Focusing on marriage arguably
implements Dorothy Allison and Esther Newton's imperative that queer
theorists "deconstruct heterosexuality first,"2 rather than deconstruct gay,
lesbian and bisexual identity while paradoxically leaving unchallenged
constructions of heterosexuality as natural, essential, superior, or inevita-
ble. One way to deconstruct (and reconstruct) marriage is to attach value
to labor done by homemakers for their families. While homemaking la-
bor could be commodified using various market-based models,3 I have
* Assistant Professor, University of Denver College of Law; B.A., Wellesley College; J.D.,
Northwestern University School of Law. This essay benefited considerably from comments from the
University of Denver InterSEXionality Symposium participants, including Nan Boyd, Pat Cain,
Mary Anne Case, Alan Chen, Fred Cheever, Roberto Corrada, David Cruz, Nancy Ehrenreich,
Karen Engle, Katherine Franke, Sheila Hyatt, Cathy Kemp, Jean Love, Julie Nice, Ana Ortiz, Karla
Robertson, Jane Schacter, Susan Sterett, Kendall Thomas, and Frank Valdes. The University of
Denver College of Law supported this essay by funding the InterSEXionality Symposium, the
InterSEXionality reading group, and the research for this essay.
1. BENJAMiN CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 129 (1928). Another
commentator on the reinvigoration of alimony used this quotation as an epigram in her comment on
Joan Williams' proposal to redefine family wealth entitlements. See Emily Field Van Tassel,
Rebinding the Sticks: A Comment on Is Coverture Dead?, 82 GEO. L.J. 2291 (1994) (commenting on
Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227 (1994)).
2. The danger of queer theorists applying constructionist analysis only to discuss gay and
lesbian issues is that doing so deconstructs homosexuality, leaving heterosexuality in its naturalized,
superior position. Dorothy Allison and Esther Newton foresaw this danger and produced buttons
demanding that queer theorists "Deconstruct Heterosexuality First." Lisa Duggan, Queering the
State, in SEX WARS: SEXUAL DISSENT AND POLITICAL CULTURE 179, 185 (Lisa Duggan & Nan D.
Hunter eds., 1995) [hereinafter SEX WARS].
3. Other commentators have suggested partnership models as appropriate vehicles to justify
post-divorce income sharing. See, e.g., Jana B. Singer, Alimony and Efficiency: The Gendered Costs
and Benefits of the Economic Justification for Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2423, 2454-60 (1994); Cynthia
Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with Dolls, Partnership
Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 67, 71 (1993). A recent article
analyzes premarital agreements by exploring how U.C.C. Article 2, by analogy, might govern their
terms and enforcement. See Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of
1215
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
proposed elsewhere that marriage be commercialized through Premarital
Security Agreements, or PSAs.'
PSAs would establish a debtor/creditor relationship between
spouses in order to quantify and value homemaker contributions to fam-
ily wealth. Governed by the same rules as Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, PSAs would arise at the beginning of the marriage,
and would recognize homemaker contributions to family wealth by
treating the primary homemaker as a creditor in relation to her' primary
wage-earning spouse. The debt is based on the primary homemaker's
contributions to the joint marital enterprise. Specifically, the primary
wage-earner would be indebted to the primary homemaker for the value
of the homemaker's domestic labor and lost opportunity costs, which
enable him to attain "ideal worker" status.' If the marriage endures, the
primary wage-earner pays his debt to the homemaker by sharing with her
the stream of income he enjoys by virtue of his ideal worker status. If
instead the spouses divorce, the divorce would constitute default on the
loan, entitling the primary homemaker to foreclose on collateral (desig-
nated as 50 percent of marital property) in order to get the expected re-
turn (continued sharing of the primary wage-earning spouse's income)
on her loan of homemaking services and lost opportunity costs. The
amount of the debt would be calculated as an annual payment equal to 30
percent of the difference between the spouses' income at the time of di-
vorce. These payments would continue for a period of years equal to half
Premarital Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 145, 188-89
(1998).
4. For a fuller analysis describing how PSAs could commercialize marriage, see Martha M.
Ertman, Commercializing Marriage: A Proposal for Valuing Women's Work Through Premarital
Security Agreements, 77 TEx. L. REv. 17 (1998) [hereinafter Ertman, Commercializing Marriage].
5. This essay uses female pronouns to refer to primary homemakers and male pronouns to
refer to ideal workers, since women and men are likely to play these respective roles in typical
heterosexual marriages. The adjective "primary" reflects the wage labor of many people who also
have primary responsibility for homemaking. In 1996, 70 percent of married mothers participated in
the wage labor force. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 404 tbl. 631 (117th ed. 1997). But many of these women tailor their work
force participation to accommodate caregiving responsibilities. They might, for example, work part
time, only part of the year, or near home. See VICTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC
EQUALITY 41, 60 (1988). Consequently, women on average earn less than men. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, MONEY INCOME IN THE UNITED STATES: 1996, at 26-27 tbl. 7
(1997). This gendered wage gap occurs in all racial groups, but is less pronounced between men and
women of color than between white men and women. Id. Regardless of their employment status,
women in heterosexual relationships do most of the housework. ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE
SECOND SHIFT 8 (1989). These patterns suggest the accuracy, on average, of using female pronouns
to describe primary homemakers and male pronouns to describe primary wage-eamers. However,
there is nothing in the proposed Premarital Security Agreements that requires that gender or sex
determine which role a spouse plays, or even that there be a primary homemaker and an ideal
worker. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage, supra note 4, at 75-76.
6. Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227,
2255-56 (1994) ("A wife who shoulders childrearing and other domestic responsibilities allows her
husband... to perform as an ideal worker.").
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the duration of the marriage plus the difference between 18 and the age
of the youngest minor child.
Set out as a formula, the calculation looks as follows:
Annual Payment Duration
(.3(high income - low income)) (length of marriage + (18 - age of youngest minor child))
7
2
PSAs are the latest contribution in a wave of recent scholarship
which has sought to create a theory of alimony to alleviate the twin
problems of displaced homemaker indigency and the general devaluation
of women's work in both the home and market. Most analysis regarding
reinvigorating alimony falls into four categories: legal economic and
liberal, cultural, or radical feminist. Perhaps due to ideological divides
between these approaches, no single proposal has generated broad-based
support. Commercializing marriage through PSAs has the potential to
achieve this cross-over appeal by satisfying much of what these disparate
proposals seek to achieve.8 In Commercializing Marriage: A Proposal for
Valuing Women's Work Through Premarital Security Agreements, I
explain how PSAs would operate, and contend that PSAs have the po-
tential to appeal to legal economic as well as liberal, cultural, and radical
feminist approaches.
This essay further develops the crossover potential of PSAs, ex-
ploring whether commercializing marriage through PSAs has the poten-
tial to queer marriage doctrine.'" If so, such commercialization would
doctrinally implement some of the insights of intersectionality theory, as
it implicates (to a greater or lesser extent) sex, gender, class, and sexual
orientation." Consistent with the theme of this Symposium, this approach
could be described as InterSEXional."
7. For further discussion of the amount of the marital debt secured by the premarital security
interest, see Ertman, Commercializing Marriage, supra note 4, at 43-50.
8. See Ertman, Commercializing Marriage, supra note 4, at 63-97.
9. Id.
10. "Queer" is increasingly used as a verb to describe the application of queer theoretical
insights to various contexts. See, e.g., CARL F. STYCHIN, LAW'S DESIRE: SEXUALITY AND THE
LIMITs OF JUSTICE 150 (1995) (contending that the majority opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986), "'queers' the statute so that the boundary between acts and identities is muddied");
Duggan, supra note 2, at 179 ("The time has come to think about queering the state."); Jonathan
Goldberg, Introduction to QUEERING THE RENAISSANCE 1, 1 (Jonathan Goldberg ed., 1994) ("[T]he
process of queering the Renaissance has been under way for some time."). While the definition of
the term "queer" is deliberately left open to minimize essentialist dangers, when used as a verb it
generally connotes applying the insights of queer theory to new contexts, such as law, activism, or
history. To queer something is often to turn it on its head, show the contingency of its underpinnings,
and perhaps reveal the subversive potential in something that seems to be the very cornerstone of
traditional gender relations.
11. Some theorists might object to describing an analysis that accounts for dominant identities,
such as heterosexuality, as intersectional (or interSEXional). For example, Peter Kwan states:
[S]traight white maleness arguably is a multiple identity, but intersectionality theorists
would resist the claim by straight white males that theirs is an intersectional subjectivity.
Central to intersectionality theory is the recovery of the claims and identities of those
19981 1217
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Part I of this essay briefly describes PSAs and sketches how they
have the potential to appeal to a wide range of ideological positions. Part
II expands this analysis to speculate what various queer theorists might
appreciate and/or object to about PSAs. Specifically, PSAs might interest
queer legal theorists because they could implement the insights of queer
theory by: (1) revealing the constructed nature of heterosexuality and
thus undermining compulsory heterosexuality; 3 (2) accounting for gen-
der performativity and strategic provisionality;"' (3) queering the state;"
(4) intervening in legal conflations of sex, gender, and sexual
orientation; 6 and/or (5) creating social space for same-sex marriage by
focusing marriage doctrine on economic rather than gendered or sexed
aspects of heterosexual marriage." Some queer theorists might object to
the way that PSAs could buttress compulsory heterosexuality, reinforce
race and class hierarchy by treating white, middle and upper-middle class
marriages as paradigmatic, and/or ignore important concerns of many
people of color and poor people by focusing on marriage as the major
who, like African-American women, are pushed to the margins of the racial discourse
because of assumptions of patriarchal normativity, and simultaneously pushed to the
margins of the feminist discourse because of assumptions of racial normativity.
Peter Kwan, Jeffrey Dahmer and the Cosynthesis of Categories, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1257, 1275
(1997). Given the importance of deconstructing unmarked as well as marked categories, and in
particular deconstructing heterosexuality first or at least concurrently with deconstructing
marginalized sexual identities, see supra note 2, this essay describes its methodology as
intersectional (or interSEXional) despite its focus on some privileged categories.
12. InterSEXionality is a term coined by the University of Denver faculty reading group as we
planned this conference. The term is intended to invoke multiple levels of intersectional analysis
while focusing on sexual orientation. First, it explores ways in which legal regulations invoke race,
class, gender, sex, sexuality, and other identity categories, focusing on sexual orientation as the hub
of the analysis. Second, InterSEXionality engages interdisciplinary methods to understand how
various identities interact under legal regulation. In particular, InterSEXionality applies insights of
queer theory (which actively contests identity categories) to legal analysis (which is firmly grounded
in identity categories). Third, and perhaps most ambitiously, InterSEXionality explores
interrelationships among ostensibly separate identity categories such as sex, gender, sexuality, and
sexual orientation.
13. See Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in THE LESBIAN
AND GAY STUDIES READER 227 (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter Rich, Compulsory
Heterosexuality].
14. See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE 141 (1990) [hereinafter BUTLER, GENDER
TROUBLE]; Judith Butler, Imitation and Gender Insubordination, in INSIDE OUT: LESBIAN
THEORIES, GAY THEORIES 13, 19 (Diana Fuss ed., 1991) [hereinafter Butler, Imitation].
15. See supra note 10.
16. See Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The
Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (1995); Katherine M.
Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1995); Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys:
Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation' in Euro-American
Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1, 129 (1995) [hereinafter Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes and
Tomboys]; see also Francisco Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy: Tracing the Conflation of Sex,
Gender & Sexual Orientation to Its Origins, 8 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 161, 211 (1996) [hereinafter
Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy].
17. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419,
1494-95 (1993).
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route for gay/lesbian liberation. 8 Finally, Part III briefly explores the
feasibility and some implications of applying PSAs to same-sex relation-
ships. If commercializing marriage through PSAs has at least some of the
effects suggested, PSAs could well contribute to the transformation of
marriage, perhaps reconstructing it into an institution in which the
spouses are more equal than they are currently. PSAs, moreover, would
shift the focus of marriage doctrine away from sex and gender and to-
ward the economic aspects of the relationship. If PSAs could queer legal
doctrine regulating marriage, they would make an important contribution
toward reconstructing marriage. This reconstructed institution would
further the goals of queer theory by subverting the construction of mar-
riage (and heterosexual coupling) as natural. Once heterosexuality loses
its naturalized status, legal regulations that penalize same-sex sexuality
as deviant lose their justification. In short, queer legal theorists could
make significant headway toward their ultimate goals by focusing on the
(often unexamined) legal regulations governing heterosexual marriage.
I. PREMARITAL SECURITY AGREEMENTS DESCRIBED AND APPLIED
A. Defining Premarital Security Agreements
Premarital Security Agreements mirror commercial security agree-
ments. In a typical secured transaction, a creditor extends credit to a
debtor, who grants the creditor a security interest in collateral to secure
repayment of the loan. Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code gen-
erally governs secured transactions when the collateral is personal prop-
18. This essay assumes that queer theorists care about race and class. This assumption, like
any other assertion about queers or queer theory is made difficult by queer theory's deliberate refusal
to define "queer." Some people define queer as not fitting in to the mainstream, and define the queer
community as an "oxymoronic community"
of men, women, transsexuals, gay males, lesbians, bisexuals, straight men and women,
African Americans, Chicanos, Asian Americans, Native Americans, people who can see
and/or walk and people who cannot, welfare recipients, trust fund recipients, wage
earners, Democrats, Republicans, and anarchists-to name a few .... Indeed, since
difference from the "norm" is about all that many people in the "gay community" have in
common with each other, these sorts of "gay and lesbian" gatherings, at their best and
worst and most radical, seem to be spaces where cross-sections of the human mulitverse
can gather together to thrash out differences and perhaps to lay the groundwork for
peaceful and productive futures .... In my most naively hopeful moments, I often
imagine it will be the "queer community"-the oxymoronic community of difference-
that might be able to teach the world how to get along.
Lisa Duggan, Making it Perfectly Queer, in SEX WARS, supra note 2, at 155, 163 (quoting Louise
Sloan, Beyond Dialogue, S.F. BAY GUARDIAN LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Mar. 1991, at 3). Suzanna
Danuta Walters offers the following critique of queer theory:
[I]f all that we share is a nonnormative sexuality and a disenfranchisement, then why not
be totally inclusive? This reduces queer politics to a banal (and potentially dangerous)
politics of simple opposition, potentially affiliating groups, identities, and practices that
are explicitly and implicitly in opposition to each other. To link politically and
theoretically around a "difference" from normative heterosexuality imposes a (false)
unity around disparate practices and communities.
Suzanna Danuta Walters, From Here to Queer: Radical Feminism, Postmodernism, and the Lesbian
Menace (Or, Why Can't a Woman Be More Like a Fag?), 21 SIGNS 830, 838-39 (1996).
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erty.'9 The security interest can arise in several ways: the creditor can
take possession of the collateral, the parties can execute a writing (the
security agreement), or the interest can arise as a matter of law." Exe-
cuting a writing is the typical way to create the security interest. Once a
lender has the status of a secured creditor, it can, upon default, repossess
the collateral.' While not without its critics,22 this arrangement has served
both debtors and creditors by facilitating the extension of credit and by
protecting creditors against the risks of default.
I have argued elsewhere that contemporary marriage resembles this
credit relationship in several respects. 3 In many marriages, one spouse is
the primary wage-earner and the other spouse is primarily responsible for
childcare and other homemaking tasks. Joan Williams has dubbed this
marriage between an ideal worker and primary homemaker "the domi-
nant family ecology."' Under this arrangement, the primary homemaker
contributes to family wealth by supporting her spouse's efforts to be-
come an ideal worker. Specifically, the primary homemaker performs
domestic services that enable the primary wage-earner's full-time, year-
round participation in the wage labor force, and in doing so she also in-
curs lost opportunity costs by devoting primary attention to her spouse's
income potential instead of her own. The homemaker thus extends credit
to her primary wage-earning spouse, expecting to be repaid by sharing the
primary wage-earner's income over the course of the wage-earner's career.
Unfortunately for primary homemakers and their children,' distribution of
family assets and liabilities at divorce does not reflect these homemaker
contributions to family wealth. Since the major asset in most divorces is
19. See U.C.C. § 9-102 (1995) ("[T]his Article applies ... to any transaction .. .which is
intended to create a security interest in personal property.").
20. See U.C.C. § 9-203 (1995) (describing how security interests arise under Article 9 by
either possession of collateral or a signed writing describing the collateral); U.C.C. § 9-310 (1995)
(recognizing statutory liens).
21. U.C.C. § 9-503 (1995) (allowing a secured creditor to take possession of collateral without
judicial process if repossession can be accomplished without breach of the peace).
22. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, The Repo Code: A Study of Adjustment to Uncertainty in
Commercial Law, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 549, 550-51 (1997) (suggesting that Article 9 be amended to
define specific actions which constitute breach of the peace).
23. See Ertman, Commercializing Marriage, supra note 4.
24. Williams, supra note 6, at 2229. The paradigmatic marriage in which women are
financially dependent on men may be most prevalent among white middle and upper middle class
marriages. See Twila L. Perry, Alimony: Race, Privilege and Dependency in the Search for Theory,
82 GEO. L.J. 2481, 2486-89 (1994). In African American marriages, in contrast, there is less of a
wage gap between men and women, and women are likely to contribute 40 percent of household
income, compared to the 29 percent contributed on average by white wives. Dorothy A. Brown, The
Marriage Bonus/Penalty in Black and White, 65 U. CIN. L. REv. 787, 793, 795-96 (1997).
25. Mothers are much more likely to be awarded custody of children of the marriage upon
divorce. Williams, supra note 6, at 2227 n.144 (stating that "fathers gain sole physical custody in
less than 10% of divorces" (citing ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE
CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 112 (1992))).
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the primary wage-earner's stream of income,26 it is particularly unfair that
this asset is usually allocated entirely to the primary wage-earner.
One reason that homemaker contributions to the wage-earner's in-
come stream have not been valued at divorce is the difficulty encoun-
tered in precise quantification of the homemaker's contribution. Precise
valuation is elusive because the value of homemaking can be calculated
in at least three different ways: the cost of replacing a homemaker's
services with market labor; the lost opportunity costs borne by the
homemaker; and/or econometric methods based on economic theory and
statistical analysis. 7 While the lost opportunity cost model is popular
among some commentators," it also has been criticized by feminists be-
cause it focuses only on costs borne by homemakers and fails to account
for the benefits primary wage-earners enjoy as a result of traditional gen-
dered divisions of domestic labor. 9 Rough figures for quantifying the
way that primary wage-earners benefit from their spouses' homemaking
are suggested by two studies indicating that men whose wives do not
participate in the wage labor force earn 20-25 percent more than men
whose wives work for wages.0 I propose a formula for calculating the
debt that accounts for this research. The debt is calculated as annual
payments of 30 percent of the difference between the spouses' incomes
at the time of divorce, paid for a period equal to half the marriage plus
the time until the youngest child turns 18. This formula accounts for pri-
mary homemakers' decreased wages due to their focus on homemaking
rather than wage labor,3' for the contributions custodians of young chil-
dren make to their former spouses' post-divorce income, and also for the
pre-divorce contributions of primary homemakers in marriages that end
after the children are grown. While inexact, this valuation of homemaker
26. Williams, supra note 6, at 2229.
27. See C.C. Fischer, The Valuation of Household Production: Divorce, Wrongful Injury and
Death Litigation, 53 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 187 (1994) (examining valuation of overall "household
production" by applying methods of forensic economics).
28. See, e.g., Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1,54-55 (1989).
29. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 3, at 2444-47.
30. Joy A. Schneer & Freida Reitman, Effects of Alternative Family Structures on Managerial
Career Paths, 36 ACAD. MGMT. J. 830, 831 (1993) (finding that male MBA degree holders with
homemaker spouses and children made 20 percent more than men whose spouses worked for
wages); Linda K. Stroh & Jeanne M. Brett, The Dual-Earner Dad Penalty in Salary Progression, 35
HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 181, 195 (1996) (study showing that managers whose wives did not work
enjoyed 11 percent more in salary increases over five years than managers whose wives worked for
wages); see also Tamar Lewin, Men Whose Wives Work Earn Less, Studies Show, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
12, 1994, at Al.
31. Remunerating primary homemakers for their contributions to family wealth through
homemaking services and lost opportunity costs makes particular sense in light of the second shift
that most women work in order to make up for their male partner's more modest involvement with
household management. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 5, at 8.
32. For further discussion of the formula, see Ertman, Commercializing Marriage, supra note
4, at 43-50.
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contributions to family wealth improves on the current default rule, which
fails in most circumstances to place any value on home-making.33
In short, PSAs would quantify the primary wage-earner's debt to the
primary homemaker and designate 50 percent of all marital property as
collateral securing the debt. ' Dissolution of the marriage would be the
equivalent of default on a commercial loan, giving the primary home-
maker, like any other secured creditor, the right to repossess and dispose
of the collateral to satisfy the debt. 5
PSAs, like commercial security agreements, can arise in two ways:
either through a writing conveying the security interest, or as a matter of
law. If PSAs are created through a signed writing, that writing should
describe the collateral. In either case the debtor must have an interest in
the collateral and the creditor must give value.36 Creating the PSA
through a signed writing would be simple, since fianc6es could sign the
security agreement when they execute other documents necessary to ob-
tain a marriage license. In the alternative, PSAs could arise as a matter of
law, either through common law or statute. Statutory liens, for example,
grant an auto mechanic a security interest in the automobile to secure
payment for repair services." Society should have at least as strong an
interest in valuing homemaker contributions to family wealth as it does
in protecting the auto repair business. There are advantages and disad-
vantages to each method of creating PSAs, but on balance a signed writ-
ing is preferable for purposes of both record keeping and allowing
spouses to tailor their conduct during marriage to achieve desired results
in the event of divorce.38 To the extent that queer theorists have a stake in
how PSAs are created, they might prefer a PSA created through a signed
33. Alimony is awarded in a minority of divorces. Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and
Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1106 (1989) (describing United States Census Bureau data
indicating that 9.3 percent of women were awarded permanent alimony between 1887 and 1906,
15.4 percent in 1916, 14.6 percent in 1922, compared to Lenore Weitzman's data indicating that in
1968 less than 19 percent of divorcees were awarded alimony and, in 1977, only 16.5 percent of
divorces included alimony awards).
34. It is important to note that the debt and the collateral are separate. Fifty percent of marital
property is collateral securing the loan. Because the most important asset in most divorces is the
post-divorce stream of income, my proposal designates part of post-divorce income as marital
property. The debt, or actual loan, is considerably smaller. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage,
supra note 4, at 52-53. Commercial creditors typically oversecure a loan with collateral worth more
than the loan amount to ensure full repayment of the debt.
35. Tangible marital property could be repossessed and sold pursuant to U.C.C. §§ 9-503 and
504 (1995). Intangible property, such as stream of income, could be accessed through garnishment
proceedings. Garnishment is already used to satisfy child support and maintenance obligations. See,
e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-14-111.5 (1997) (authorizing income assignment to collect child
support and maintenance).
36. U.C.C. § 9-203 (1995).
37. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-20-106 to -116 (1997); see also COLO. REV. STAT. §
42-9-104(11) (1997) (establishing liens on property such as motor vehicles upon which repair work
has been done but not paid for).
38. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage, supra note 4, at 55-57.
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writing to one arising as a matter of law because executing the writing
could destabilize gender hierarchies by making the spouses aware of the
way that PSAs alter power differentials between spouses, and also could
increase the possibility of men doing more homemaking in order to avoid
the security interest in their post-divorce income. 9
Whether PSAs are created by a signed writing or by operation of
law, they would dramatically improve the financial situation of many
primary homemakers. Women, on average, suffer a marked decrease in
standard of living after divorce, while men enjoy a marked increase in
post-divorce standard of living. ' The Displaced Homemaker Network
has reported that 57 percent of all displaced homemakers live in or near
poverty, and that divorced women of color disproportionately suffer from
impoverishment."1 This gendered disparity in post-divorce standards of
living could be due at least in part to statutory provisions which discour-
age long-term alimony. 2
39. Queer theorists also might prefer consensual security agreements because they do not turn
on the status of the parties in the same way that repair and mechanics' liens do. See U.C.C. § 9-102
cmt. 2 (1995). On the other hand, statutory liens become common knowledge after sustained use in
the community, so that PSAs could affect the gendered nature of marriage even if they arose as a
matter of law. Some queer theorists might, moreover, contest the distinction between the two ways
of creating a security interest, arguing that the consensual nature of an executed security agreement
is largely illusory given the state monopoly on recognizing marriage and allocating benefits based on
it, paired with the forces of compulsory heterosexuality that push many people into marriage.
40. Lenore Weitzman's famous data suggested that, upon divorce, women's standard of living
decreases 73 percent while men's standard of living increases 42 percent. See LENORE J. WErrMAN,
THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN
AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 338-39 (1985). Subsequent studies indicate that divorced women suffer a
financial penalty (albeit less of one than that claimed by Weitzman). See, e.g., Richard R. Peterson, A
Re-evaluation of the Economic Consequences of Divorce, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 528, 530-33 (1996)
(replicating Weitzman's research on the same data and finding a 27 percent decrease in women's
standard of living and a 10 percent improvement for men); Lenore J. Weitzman, The Econmic
Consequences of Divorce Are Still Unequal: Comment on Peterson, 61 AM. Soc. REv. 537, 537-38
(1996) (contending that original data no longer exist but conceding a sample weighting error); see also
Saul D. Hoffman & Greg J. Duncan, What Are the Economic Consequences of Divorce?, 25
DEMOGRAPHY 641 (1988) (finding that women suffer an approximately 30 percent drop in their standard
of living in the first year after divorce).
41. Starnes, supra note 3, at 79-80 (citing the Displaced Homemakers Network 1990 Status
Report which states that 61 percent of African American and 62.3 percent of Hispanic displaced
homemakers are poor, compared to 27.8 percent of white displaced homemakers).
42. Section 308 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (U.M.D.A.) provides that a court should
order maintenance
only if... the spouse seeking maintenance: (1) lacks sufficient property to provide for
his reasonable needs; and (2) is unable to support himself through appropriate
employment or is the custodian of a child whose condition or circumstances make it
appropriate that the custodian not be required to seek employment outside the home.
UNIF. MARRIAGE& DIVORCE Act § 308(a) (amended 1973), 9A(I) U.L.A. 446 (1998). U.M.D.A. § 308
further directs courts to take into account six factors in determining the amount and duration of
maintenance, including:
(1) the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance ... ; (2) the time necessary to
acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find
appropriate employment; (3) the standard of living established during the marriage; (4)
the duration of the marriage; (5) the age and physical and emotional condition of the
1998] 1223
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In commercial terms this pattern suggests a market failure in current
divorce doctrine: Homemakers are extending credit to enable their
spouses to become ideal workers, but many are not getting repaid. By
allocating the risk of loss to the primary homemaker, current alimony
doctrine both discourages people from being primary homemakers and
gives primary wage-earners a windfall by allowing them to walk away
from marriage with family wealth attributable to homemaker contribu-
tions. While numerous scholars bemoan the current divorce standards
which devalue homemaking (reflecting and perpetuating the general de-
valuation of women's labor), no single proposal for remunerating home-
making has won support across the ideological spectrum.
B. Premarital Security Agreements' Crossover Potential
Commentators have suggested divorce reforms that could correct
this market failure. Proposals include reinstituting fault-based divorce (or
at least strengthening fault-based alimony), 3 redefining family property
to include the primary wage-earner's post-divorce income, ' reconceptu-
alizing family as a mother and child unit and supporting this unit through
the public fisc," and using partnership and contract principles to divide
gains and losses due to gendered divisions of wage labor and primary
homemaking.' While all of these proposals share the insight that home-
making should be valued at divorce, none of the proposals has garnered
universal support. This lack of consensus is largely due to ideological dif-
spouse seeking maintenance; and (6) the ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is
sought to meet his needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance.
ld § 308(b). Although the U.M.D.A. uses the term "maintenance" to describe post-divorce payments
from one spouse to another, this essay generally uses the term "alimony," as do most of the participants in
the theoretical debate about post-divorce income-sharing. While practice distinguishes sharply between
alimony and property division, experts have faltered when pressed to distinguish clearly between the two.
See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 592-93 (2d ed.
1987). Accordingly, while this essay focuses on alimony, the PSA could as easily be classified as a
division of property.
43. See, e.g., Allen M. Parkman, Reform of the Divorce Provisions of the Marriage Contract,
8 BYU J. PUB. L. 91, 93 (1993).
44. See Williams, supra note 6, at 2258.
45. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 230-31 (1995).
46. See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig & June Carbone, The Reliance Interest in Marriage and
Divorce, 62 TUL. L. REv. 855, 885 (1988) (stating that no-fault "alimony, like contract damages,
emphasizes restitution," and that the law analogizes marriage to a business partnership); Lloyd
Cohen, Marriage, Divorce and Quasi-Rents; or, "I Gave Him the Best Years of My Life," 16 J. LEG.
STUD. 267 (1987) (comparing the marriage contract to a commercial contract); Ellman, supra note
28, at 9-10 (criticizing the application of contract and partnership concepts to alimony and
proposing a lost opportunity cost model); Joan M. Krauskopf, Theories of Property Division/Spousal
Support: Searching for Solutions to the Mystery, 23 FAM. L.Q. 252, 255-71 (1989) (exploring
various theories upon which to fashion practical distinctions between property division entitlements
and spousal support obligations); Singer, supra note 33, at 1114 (suggesting an investment
partnership model of marriage); Starnes, supra note 3, at 108-09 (proposing a business partnership
model for valuing homemaking).
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ferences among the proposals. As I have argued elsewhere, PSAs have the
potential to attract the cross over appeal that has eluded other proposals."'
Most of the proposals for reinvigorating alimony are either legal
economic or cultural feminist.8 Legal economic approaches tend to focus
on efficiency and deterring opportunism in marriage. Some legal eco-
nomic approaches are also traditionalist, and make normative and posi-
tive claims about gendered specialization in marriage.'9 Cultural feminist
approaches seek to value homemaking contributions to family wealth,
and in doing so protect women and their children from indigency and
near-indigency" Liberal feminist approaches, in contrast, take the formal
equality position that both men and women should be encouraged to
share equally in wage and homemaking labor. Liberal feminist scholars
thus worry that generous alimony rules would encourage women to adopt
traditional gender roles and remain dependent on men." Finally, radical
47. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage, supra note 4, at 63-97.
48. These labels are inevitably reductionist and do not (nor are they intended to) reflect the
full range of feminist or legal economic thought. They do, however, give a sense of the ideological
variation in approaches to divorce reform. For further discussion of these ideological approaches, see
id. at 66, 74-75, 76-79, 88-92.
49. Legal economic approaches include Kristian Bolin, The Marriage Contract and Efficient
Rules for Spousal Support, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 493, 501 (1994); Brinig & Carbone, supra note 46,
at 901-02; June Carbone, Income Sharing: Redefining the Family in Terms of Community, 31 Hous. L.
REV. 359, 414-15 (1994); June Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology,
Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L. REV. 953, 958-61 (1991); Cohen, supra note 46, at
303; Ellman, supra note 28, at 11; Joan M. Krauskopf, Recompense for Financing Spouses' Education:
Legal Protection for the Marital Investor in Human Capital, 28 KAN. L. REv. 379, 416 (1980); Elisabeth
M. Landes, Economics of Alimony, 7 J. LEG. STUD. 35, 62 (1978); Parkman, supra note 43, at 93;
Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REv. 9, 94 (1990).
50. Feminist approaches can be described in different ways. See, e.g., MARY BECKER ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY 67-118 (1994)
(excerpting six feminist approaches, including the dominance critique of formal equality, a defense
of formal equality, hedonic feminism, pragmatism, socialist feminism, and postmodern feminism).
This essay and Commercializing Marriage, supra note 4, define liberal feminism as an approach
which supports legal rules that treat men and women similarly in most situations, cultural feminism
as an approach that seeks to value the work that most women do in the home (and workplace), and
radical feminism as an approach that seeks to deconstruct the dualities of sex, gender, and sexual
orientation that inform the discourse of gender and sex equality. Ertman, Commercializing
Marriage, supra note 4, at 27-28.
Cultural feminist approaches include ideas suggested in FINEMAN, supra note 45, at 232; Ann
Lacquer Estin, Can Families Be Efficient?, 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1-2 (1996); Ann Lacquer Estin,
Economics and the Problem of Divorce, 2 U. CM. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 517, 519-20 (1995); Ann
Lacquer Estin, Love and Obligation: Family Law and the Romance of Economics, 36 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 989, 1086 (1995); Ann Lacquer Estin, Maintenance, Alimony and the Rehabilitation of Family
Care, 71 N.C. L. REV. 721, 803 (1993); Singer, supra note 3, at 2423; Singer, supra note 33, at 1121;
Starnes, supra note 3, at 71-72; Williams, supra note 6, at 2227.
51. See, e.g., Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal of California's No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CAL. L.
REv. 291,319 (1987); Herma Hill Kay, Beyond No-Fault Divorce: New Directions in Divorce Reform, in
DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 6, 36 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Henna Hill Kay eds., 1990);
Herna Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U.
CtN. L. REv. 1, 90 (1987); Krauskopf, supra note 46, at 277-78; Perry, supra note 24, at 2519; J. Thomas
Oldham, Putting Asunder in the 1990s, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1091, 1102-03 (1990); Barbara Stark, Burning
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feminist analysis (at least the current, poststructural, version of radical
feminism) rejects the dualism of male/female roles and fixed identity
generally. Instead of freeing women to be women (cultural feminism) or
from being women (liberal feminism), 1990s radical feminism suggests
inverting the categories to undermine gender and sex duality and create
thepossibility of an equalitarian model of marriage that does not depend
on male and female roles.5
I have argued that PSAs might cohere with these four ideologically
disparate schools of thought, or in the alternative that PSAs could be a
procedural tool for implementing one of the other proposals. 3 PSAs'
commercial origins and their power to efficiently deter wage-earner op-
portunism further the goals of legal economics. The way PSAs increase
the value of caretaking might appeal to proponents of cultural feminism.
While liberal feminist concerns are likely to arise around PSAs' potential
to create incentives for women to adopt traditional gender roles, liberal
feminist scholars might appreciate PSAs' parallel potential to create in-
centives for more equal distribution of homemaking and wage labor.
Finally, PSAs also serve the interests of radical feminism by transform-
ing the cultural category of economically vulnerable housewife into that
of a powerful market player, the secured creditor. In sum, PSAs may
have cross-over analytical appeal as a solution to the problems of dis-
placed homemaker indigency and the general devaluation of women's
work.
This essay extends the ideological crossover analysis to queer the-
ory, exploring whether PSAs might also cohere with queer legal theory.
In doing so, this essay breaks new ground in its application of queer
theoretical insights to heterosexual family law problems, a considerable
extension beyond the usual focus of queer theory on gay/lesbian/ bisex-
ual/transgendered issues.
II. PREMARITAL SECURITY AGREEMENTS' APPLICABILITY TO QUEER
LEGAL THEORY
Queer legal theory builds on the insights of poststructuralism, femi-
nist and critical race theory, as well as critical legal studies to critique
Down the House: Toward a Theory of More Equitable Distribution, 40 RurGERS L. REV. 1173, 1207
(1988).
52. Radical feminist scholars have been largely silent in this discussion, with notable
exceptions. See, e.g., Note, Patriarchy Is Such a Drag: The Strategic Possibilities of a Postmodern
Account of Gender, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1973 (1995) [hereinafter Patriarchy Is Such a Drag]. Some
approaches combine cultural and radical feminist elements. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN,
THE ILLUSION OF EQUAITY 47, 176 (1991); JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: MARKET WORK
AND FAMILY WORK IN THE 20TH CENTURY (forthcoming 1999); Martha L.A. F'meman, Masking
Dependency: The Political Role of Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REv. 2181, 2215 (1995); Williams, supra
note 6, at 2229.
53. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage, supra note 4, at 63-97, 110-11.
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legal theory and doctrine based on their impact on gay people.' In doing
so, queer legal theory focuses on issues of identity, specifically how legal
regulations turn on identity. Still in its infancy (some would argue, still
gestating), queer legal theory remains in a state of flux. At this moment,
one of its key challenges is to theorize the legal relevance of intersecting
identities." Queer theory thus builds on intersectionality theory,56 striving
to account for the ways that legal theory and doctrine can account for
each person's multiple identities (such as gender, sex, race, class, and
sexual orientation).5" Queer theorists have coined various terms to de-
scribe this post-intersectional approach, including interconnectivity,58
54. I use the term "gay people" rather than "queers" because most queer theory scholarship
focuses on gay men and lesbians. See, e.g., Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1462 (1992); Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy, supra note 16, at 161.
55. Two other fora also have addressed these issues. This topic was the subject of a program
sponsored by the Sections on Gay and Lesbian Issues and Minority Groups titled Race, Ethnicity and
Sexual Orientation: Crossing New Intersections in Law and Scholarship at the 1998 Annual Meeting
of the Association of American Law Schools. The Hastings Law Journal also sponsored a
symposium titled Intersexions: The Legal & Social Construction of Sexual Orientation, 48
HASTINGS L.J. 1101 (1997). Most relevant for purposes of the present symposium on
InterSEXionality are the Hastings Law Journal symposium articles focusing on intersections of race,
ethnicity, class, gender and sexual orientation. See Paisley Currah, Defending Genders: Sex and
Gender Non-Conformity in the Civil Rights Strategies of Sexual Minorities, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1363
(1997); Ruth Colker, Sexual Orientation: Militarism, Moralism, and Capitalism, 48 HASTINGS L.J
1201 (1997); Terry S. Kogan, Transsexuals and Critical Gender Theory: The Possibility of a
Restroom Labeled "Other, " 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1223 (1997); Kwan, supra note 11; Francisco Valdes,
Queer Margins, Queer Ethics: A Call to Account for Race and Ethnicity in the Law, Theory, and
Politics of "Sexual Orientation," 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1293 (1997) [hereinafter Valdes, Queer
Margins].
It is important to note that not all queer theorists contest all categories. See, e.g., DAN
DANIELSEN & KAREN ENGLE, AFTER IDENTITY at xv (1995) ("Post-identity scholars articulate a set
of strategies that acknowledge our simultaneous and ambivalent desire both to affirm our identities
and to transcend them."); Patricia A. Cain, Lesbian Perspective, Lesbian Experience, and the Risk of
Essentialism, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 43, 56, 65 (1994) (suggesting that, unlike the category
woman, the category lesbian is a coherent basis for lesbian legal theory because (1) "[tlhe category
lesbian is too young to be destabilized," and (2) lesbians share a "core experience" of experiencing
and understanding "that transformative moment [of] realiz[ing] . . . personal erotic attraction to
another woman").
56. The ground breaking piece on intersectional theory is Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Mapping the
Margins: lntersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L.
REv. 1241 (1991).
57. Jane Schacter has argued that the anti-gay "discourse of equivalents" compares different
groups in order to decide who is entitled to civil rights protections, thus missing both commonalties
and differences between different forms of subordination. See Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights
Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283, 314
(1994) ("While all struggles for social justice must be waged with these links in mind, being
connected and being identical are not the same thing.").
58. Valdes proposes interconnectivity as a theoretical approach which he describes as
an inter-group ethic in legal scholarship that values and promotes sex/gender
inclusiveness in critical endeavors-projects that interrogate not only the way in which a
construct like "gender" affects various groups, but that also interrogate the way in which
sites of oppression are structured, deployed, and operated under the conflation in inter-
connected ways.
Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy, supra note 16, at 211; see also Valdes, Queer Margins, supra
note 55, at 1341 ("[Slecond stage theorizing must go beyond a mere application of conventional
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multidimensionality,59 and cosynthesis. The Denver University Law
Review's InterSEXionality Symposium is one more attempt to theorize
legal approaches to these fundamental problems.
A. Compulsory Heterosexuality and Gender Subordination in Marriage
Exposing legal regimes that constitute and enforce compulsory het-
erosexuality can be viewed as a key function of queer legal theory.'
Thus, queer theorists might support PSAs to the extent that PSAs reveal,
contest, and undermine compulsory heterosexuality. '2 If PSAs contribute
to exposing, challenging, and eroding compulsory heterosexuality, they
both queer legal theory and reconstruct marriage doctrine."
intersectionality to race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation.... [A] simple extension... is unworkable
because the doctrinal potency of intersectionality depends on the formal illegality of all biases under
inspection.").
59. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian
Legal Theory and Political Discourse, 29 CONN. L. REv. 561, 640 (1997) (defining
multidimensionality as "a discursive project aimed at unveiling the complexity of subordination and
identity and reshaping legal theory to reflect and respond to this complexity"); see also Berta
Esperanza Hernndez-Truyol, Building Bridges: Bringing International Human Rights Home, 9 LA
RAZA L.J. 69, 71 (1996) (pointing out that multidemensionality incorporates many categories and is
not limited to race and ethnicity). Pragmatism might offer a way to understand differences and
similarities between and among groups. Scott Brewer et al., Afterword: Symposium on the
Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1911, 1928 (1990)
(providing transcription of remarks by Jean C. Love, February 23-24, 1990, University of Southern
California Law Center) ("Pragmatism has encouraged us to create a common language and in this
way has helped us move toward a common understanding of the problem [of oppression based on
sex, race, religion and sexual orientation].").
60. See Kwan, supra note 11, at 1281 ("By paying attention to the cosynthesis of categories,
one opens up spaces for conceptualizing identities that do not prioritize one category over others.").
61. By explicitly identifying the compulsory nature of social systems that comprise
heterosexuality, Adrienne Rich could be described as the grandmother of queer theory. But two
considerations call this genealogy into question. First, Rich might object to lumping together
lesbians and gay men, let alone all stigmatized sexual minorities. See Rich, Compulsory
Heterosexuality, supra note 13, at 239 (distinguishing lesbian existence from male homosexuality).
Rich, however, has softened her stance since writing Compulsory Heterosexuality, suggesting in a
1986 annotation to the essay that both lesbian identity and "the complex 'gay' identity we share with
gay men" are relevant. Id. at 253 n.47. Second, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick has been accorded the
honor of being dubbed the mother of queer theory. See Duggan, supra note 2, at 182. Moreover,
Rich's statements in Compulsory Heterosexuality likely rankle many a contemporary queer theorist
as essentialist. See, e.g., Valdes, supra note 55, at 1329 ("Queer values, sensibilities and imperatives
are .. .suspicious of all essentializing categorization."). Despite these potential difficulties, this
essay persists in understanding Rich's contribution as an absolute prerequisite to the insights of
queer theory. Designating Rich as the grandmother of queer theory emphasizes the generational
specificity of much of queer theory (i.e., the relative youth of many of its proponents), and places
some distance between her and contemporary queer theorists while still recognizing her unique
contributions to queer theory's basic precepts.
62. Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy, supra note 16, at 170 (discussing compulsory
heterosexuality in terms of hetero-patriarchy).
63. But PSAs paradoxically could also support compulsory heterosexuality. This essay
addresses each possibility in turn.
RECONSTRUCTING MARRIAGE
1. Premarital Security Agreements Could Undermine Compulsory
Heterosexuality
PSAs could undermine compulsory heterosexuality in both theoreti-
cal and practical ways. On a theoretical level, PSAs undermine compul-
sory heterosexuality by framing marriage as a political and economic
institution. As a practical matter, PSAs subvert compulsory heterosexu-
ality by making many women in marriage more economically powerful
(and thus expanding female exit options).
First, PSAs undermine compulsory heterosexuality by revealing the
political and economic aspects of marriage. Adrienne Rich emphasizes
that "[w]e need an economics which comprehends the institution of het-
erosexuality, with its doubled workload for women and its sexual divi-
sions of labor, as the most idealized of economic institutions."' PSAs
have the potential to affect both the political and economic aspects of the
"doubled workload for women and [the] sexual divisions of labor" within
marriage. Economically, PSAs make the primary homemaker a secured
creditor with the right to collect the debt upon dissolution. Thus PSAs
make her an economically powerful party in the marriage, a secured
creditor in relation to her debtor/primary wage-earning spouse. PSAs
also reveal and improve the political implications of marriage for
women. As a secured creditor, the primary homemaker enjoys a powerful
role, particularly in relation to her primary-wage earning spouse. The
PSA tempers the weakness of the homemaker role (gendered female and
associated with domestic concerns) by adding to it the powerful role of a
secured creditor, one associated with the market (and thus gendered
male). By importing a commercial model into marriage and assigning the
primary homemaker a powerful commercial role, PSAs thus lessen
power imbalances in the home by adding power to the homemaker's role
and taking some away from the wage-earner's role. In doing so, PSAs
treat marriage as an economic institution, and destabilize the political
and economic power of the traditional marital roles.
Second, PSAs could undermine compulsory heterosexuality to the
extent that they alleviate the economic dependence of many wives on
their husbands, thus expanding homemakers' exit options. Rich defines
compulsory heterosexuality as, among other things, "a means of assuring
male right of physical, economic and emotional access" to women. ' As
long as many women have few reasonable alternatives to marriage, and
social and legal forces penalize them from exiting marriage, marriage
remains compulsory.
64. Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality, supra note 13, at 245.
65. Id. at 238.
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Rich identifies some social forces that push women to marry:
Women have married because it was necessary, in order to survive
economically, in order to have children who would not suffer eco-
nomic deprivation or social ostracism, in order to remain respectable,
in order to do what was expected of women, because coming out of
"abnormal" childhoods they wanted to feel "normal" and because
heterosexual romance has been represented as the great female ad-
venture, duty and fulfillment.6
A queer legal analysis of the compulsory nature of heterosexuality might
build on this analysis by focusing on exit options. If a legal doctrine fa-
cilitates (rather than frustrates) a woman's exit from marriage, that doc-
trine undermines compulsory heterosexuality.
The current legal rule, which provides for only minimal post-
divorce income sharing, reinforces compulsory heterosexuality by pe-
nalizing homemakers who exit marriage. The primary homemaker loses
her share of the primary wage-earner's income because legal doctrine
disregards homemaking contributions to that income. Consistent with
Rich's analysis of compulsory heterosexuality's corrosive effects on
women's freedom, this rule keeps women (particularly women in tradi-
tional gendered roles) in marriages by economically penalizing them for
leaving. Replacing the current standard with PSAs could undermine
compulsory heterosexuality by valuing homemaking labor, and remedy-
ing the injustice of the current rule. PSAs, unlike contemporary divorce
doctrine, allow a traditional wife to exit marriage without substantial
financial penalty. As such, PSAs arguably serve queer theory's agenda of
countering compulsory heterosexuality.
A third way to understand PSAs' potential to undermine compul-
sory heterosexuality turns on the sex discrimination embedded in legal
doctrine governing marriage. Andrew Koppelman has suggested that
heterosexual marriage is grounded on (white) male supremacist ideals, so
that the ban on gay marriage is sex discrimination.67 He, like Nancy Cho-
dorow, reasons that traditional gender roles in marriage perpetuate sex-
ism by creating a family environment in which women are primary
caretakers and men must individuate from their mothers in order to de-
velop a mature sense of self.6" Thus a legal rule which encourages men to
play primary caretaking roles might incrementally alleviate sexism by
undermining this tension between boys and their mothers (and thus be-
tween men and women). PSAs have the potential to further these ends in
two ways. They create an incentive for men to increase caretaking, either
66. Id. at 242.
67. See Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 201 (1994).
68. See Nancy Chodorow, Family Structure and Feminine Personality, in WOMAN, CULTURE,
AND SOCiETY 43, 66 (Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo & Louise Lamphere eds., 1974).
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by being primary caretakers (because doing so is economically and so-
cially valued through PSAs), or by more evenly dividing caretaking re-
sponsibilities than they do now (to minimize the debt and thus evade the
security interest in post-divorce income). In sum, by creating incentives
for male homemaking, treating marriage as an explicitly economic and
political institution, and increasing exit options for traditional women in
marriage, PSAs have the potential to undermine compulsory heterosexu-
ality.
2. Premarital Security Agreements Paradoxically Might Support
Compulsory Heterosexuality
While PSAs have the potential to undermine compulsory hetero-
sexuality, PSAs also could support compulsory heterosexuality in at least
three ways: (1) PSAs' focus on marriage may contribute to compulsory
heterosexuality by perpetuating the invisibility of lesbian existence;69 (2)
even if more men became the primary caretakers due to the effect of
PSAs they could remain in power;" and/or (3) PSAs could strengthen
traditional marriage by creating incentives for spouses to embrace tradi-
tional gender roles and tying a homemaker's economic situation to that
of her husband. These considerations suggest PSAs could have a more
complex interaction with compulsory heterosexuality than suggested
above.
The first reason that queer theorists might see PSAs as supporting
compulsory heterosexuality is their complicit erasure of same-sex possi-
bilities. This criticism recognizes the problems of attempting to alleviate
the effects of compulsory heterosexuality by reforming marriage, an in-
stitution both closed to gay men and lesbians and historically a corner-
69. See, e.g., Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality, supra note 13, at 227.
70. Id. at 232.
71. A fourth consideration suggests that the current alimony doctrine is not always a tool of
compulsory heterosexuality in that it provides that alimony be terminated or decreased if the
recipient remarries or cohabits with a romantic partner. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 316(b),
9A(1l) U.L.A. 102 (1998) ("Unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree,
the obligation to pay future maintenance is terminated upon the ... remarriage of the party receiving
maintenance."). Sections 5.08 and 5.10 of the Proposed Final Draft of the ALl DRAFT PRINCIPLES OF
THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1997) provide that post-
divorce income sharing terminates when the recipient remarries or cohabits (whether the
cohabitation is opposite-sex or same-sex). As discussed above, the general rule disfavoring alimony
supports compulsory heterosexuality by penalizing primary homemakers for leaving the marriage.
But the U.M.D.A. provision cutting off alimony upon remarriage discourages some heterosexual
coupling. PSAs could similarly have complex interactions with compulsory heterosexuality. On one
hand, the stream of payments under PSAs would continue even after the primary homemaker
remarried, so that PSAs arguably might discourage less heterosexual coupling than the current
regime. On the other hand, a divorcee could remarry without affecting her entitlement to a share of
her former husband's income, making remarriage more a matter of choice (and thus less
compulsory). Moreover, because PSAs increase homemakers' exit options in marriage, and few
women are awarded or collect alimony under the current regime, the net effect of PSAs could be a
decrease in the compulsory nature of heterosexuality.
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stone of female and racial subordination.72 But perhaps queer theorists
have been overly shy about addressing heterosexual marriage reform.
Given the commonly accepted construction of heterosexuality as natural,
queer theorists should deconstruct heterosexuality first, or at least con-
currently with marginalized sexual orientations." By deconstructing and
reconstructing heterosexuality, PSAs have the potential to highlight eco-
nomic aspects of marriage, and thus alter the legal understanding of mar-
riage to center more on financial aspects of the relationship than on the
gender or sexual identity of the spouses. Once legal regulation of mar-
riage is less sexed and gendered, the notion of lesbian and gay marriage
becomes socially comprehensible. While same-sex marriage is not capa-
ble of making all gay people full legal subjects,74 it would increase the
cultural visibility of gay men and lesbians generally. Some feminists
even argue that remunerating homemaking labor facilitates lesbian exis-
tence in that it enables women to come out as lesbians by giving them the
economic opportunity to do so."
The second reason queer theorists might question PSAs' ability to
undermine compulsory heterosexuality focuses on whether PSAs have
sufficient power to change gender and sexual dominance, even if they
have the power to create incentives for men to be more gendered female
and redefine the role of homemaker to make it more gendered male by
associating it with market power. Men could retain their superordinate
72. See, e.g., DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 53-69 (2d ed. 1980)
(describing the rise and fall of miscegenation doctrine); Koppelman, supra note 67; Reva Siegel,
Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49
STAN. L. REv. 1111 (1997) (describing nineteenth-century doctrinal developments which preserved
gender hierarchies in marriage by eliminating overt hierarchical arrangements but retaining gendered
rules governing domestic labor and domestic violence); see also Lea Vandervelde & Sandhya
Subramanian, Mrs. Dred Scott, 106 YALE L.J. 1033 (1997) (analyzing how the Dred Scott case
might have come out differently had Harriet Robinson Scott been the focus of the case rather than
her husband, and in doing so revealing profound racial and gender implications of nineteenth century
marriage doctrine).
73. See Duggan, supra note 2, at 182 (noting the danger of deconstructing homosexuality
without similarly deconstructing heterosexuality).
74. Hutchinson, supra note 59, at 589-90 (noting that social and economic forces would still
function to oppress many gay people even if same-sex marriage were legalized). In a similar vein, I
have argued that the process of gay people attaining full legal personhood may be gradual, stopping
in contract along the way from public condemnation to full legal protections under doctrines such as
marriage. See Martha M. Ertman, Contractual Purgatory for Sexual Marginorities: Not Heaven, but
Not Hell Either, 73 DENV. U. L. REv. 1107, 1110 (1996) [hereinafter Ertman, Contractual
Purgatory].
75. See Lesbian Women, Power of Women Collective, Lesbian Women: Love and Power, in
ALL WORK AND No PAY: WOMEN, HOUSEWORK, AND THE WAGES DuE 46, 48 (Wendy Edmond &
Suzie Fleming eds., 1975). As one commentator noted in Lesbian Women: Love and Power:
We are fighting for Wages for Housework because this struggle will enable millions of
other women to join us-to identify our struggles and our lives with their own, and, in
many cases, to become lesbian. Thousands of lesbian women are shut behind doors with
their children, only waiting for a bit of power to be able to come out.
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social and economic position even if they were primary caretakers,"6
leaving women subordinate in their new, market role as primary wage-
earners.77 Gendered hierarchies may be so entrenched that one gender
will always be on the bottom. But this possibility should not discourage
all efforts to realign gendered power differentials. The gender status quo
hurts women (as well as gay people), so there is reason to chance a re-
form even if doing so carries the risk of unintended consequences. Per-
haps PSAs would lead some men to become increasingly gendered fe-
male, and others to remain primarily gendered male. Such a mixture of
responses would preclude a monolithic redistribution of male power to
homemaking from the market. Indeed, PSAs could have a range of dif-
ferent consequences and therefore appeal to a broad ideological spectrum
of people.78 If PSAs affect different people in different ways, then they
are not a monolithic solution, but rather one way to destabilize traditional
constructions of sex, gender, and sexual orientation and to create a more
eclectic set of domestic arrangements and social views thereof.
The third and most serious reason that queer legal theorists might
object to PSAs stems from PSAs' potential to encourage both men and
women to play traditional gender roles. By compensating women who
play traditional gender roles in marriage, PSAs arguably buttress com-
pulsory heterosexuality. As I have argued elsewhere, some traditionalist
legal economists might appreciate the way that PSAs cohere with what
they see as biologically determined traditional gender roles by providing
disincentives for wage-earning husbands to opportunistically abandon
their homemaking wives. 9 If PSAs keep women and men in marriage (in
traditional marriages, no less), then PSAs arguably strengthen rather than
undermine compulsory heterosexuality. As Jane Schacter points out, this
may well be the case.'" But there are good reasons to suspect that PSAs
are at least as likely to redefine traditional marriage as they are to rein-
force it.8' Given that the status quo of legal doctrine governing marriage
is already hostile to gay people (through, for example, the ban on same-
sex marriage) and women generally, it seems worth the risk to tinker
76. See Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality, supra note 13, at 232.
77. For a version of this scenario, see If Men Could Menstruate, in GLORIA STEINEM,
OUTRAGEOUS ACTS AND EVERYDAY REBELLIONS 366 (2d ed. 1995). Steinem suggests that power
differentials might remain even if male and female biological traits were reversed, satirically
predicting that if, for example, men could menstruate,
[glenerals, right-wing politicians, and religious fundamentalists would cite menstruation
("men-struation") as proof that only men could serve God and country in combat ("You
have to give blood to take blood"), occupy high political office ("Can women be properly
fierce without a monthly cycle governed by the planet Mars?"), be priests, ministers, God
Himself ("He gave this blood for our sins"), or rabbis ("Without a monthly purge of
impurities, women are unclean").
Id. at 367.
78. See Ertman, Commercializing Marriage, supra note 4, at 96.
79. Id. at 72-73.
80. See Jane S. Schacter, Taking the Intersexional Imperative Seriously: Sexual Orientation
and Marriage Reform, 75 DENV. U. L. REv. 1255, 1257-58 (1998).
81. See Ertman, Commercializing Marriage, supra note 4, at 75-76, 92-97.
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with it. If nothing else, even a change that turns out to operate to the dis-
advantage of women and gay people creates a precedent for further
changes, some of which might be more successful. 2
In sum, queer theorists may justifiably suspect that PSAs could un-
intentionally strengthen compulsory heterosexuality by furthering gay
people's invisibility and supporting traditional heterosexual marriage.
Because of this dual possibility that PSAs could strengthen or undermine
compulsory heterosexuality (or do both), further exploration is necessary
to evaluate whether PSAs are appropriate tools to further the goals of
queer legal theory.
B. Premarital Security Agreements As Instruments of Gender Perfor-
mativity and Strategic Provisionality
Judith Butler's revolutionary theory of gender performativity (and
her related proposal that radical reforms be strategically provisional)
informs nearly every queer theory discussion. PSAs further the goals of
queer legal theory by accounting for gender performativity and being
strategically provisional.
1. Gender Performativity
In Gender Trouble, Butler suggests that gender is performative, and
that drag has the subversive potential to reveal this performativity.8 3 Drag
reveals that there is no such thing as a prepolitical, essential, or natural
gender, but rather that representations of gender are an attempt to enact a
mythical ideal. ' PSAs could implement Butler's theory of gender per-
formativity by intervening in the constructed female gender role of wife,
adding economic and social power to the wifely accoutrements of de-
pendence and powerlessness, thus simultaneously undermining the natu-
ralized hierarchies of market/family and male/female that currently con-
struct heterosexuality as biological, imperative, and necessarily hierar-
chical.
Repetition is key to Butler's theory of gender performativity. Butler
identifies the "critical task for feminism" as "locat[ing] strategies of sub-
versive repetition enabled by those [constructed identities], to affirm
82. While I am sympathetic to Schacter's insight that "[r]etrenchment can be pretty bleak,"
Schacter, supra note 80, at 1258, this risk might be balanced by the tremendous promise in altering
naturalized constructions of marriage. The no-fault revolution in divorce might not have uniformly
helped women, but it did go a long way toward desanctifying the legal regulation of marriage, thus
contributing to a climate in which PSAs are conceivable.
83. BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 14, at 136-39.
84. Id. at 137-38. Butler has clarified that she does not see gender as a free choice, akin to the
way one chooses to wear a dress or trousers each morning. To the contrary, gender norms are part of
what determine the subject, and thus constrain the range of choice one can exercise in performing a




local possibilities of intervention through participating in precisely those
practices of repetition that constitute identity and, therefore, present the
immanent possibility of contesting them."8 In other words, Butler sug-
gests that feminists identify opportunities for subversive repetition of
identity constructions, repeat those identity constructions, and in doing
so reveal identity to be socially constructed rather than natural.86
In this same vein, Butler points out that "heterosexualized genders"
are "a kind of imitation for which there is no original; in fact, [they are] a
kind of imitation that produces the very notion of the original as an effect
and consequence of the imitation itself."8 Within Butler's analysis "het-
erosexuality is always in the process of imitating and approximating its
own phantasmatic idealization of itself-andfailing."'8 Legal rules which
expose heterosexuality's perpetual, always unsuccessful, attempt to enact
a mythical ideal demonstrate the performative nature of both gender and
heterosexuality. Since heterosexuality is constructed as the original sexu-
ality (rendering alternatives such as homosexuality poor copies thereof),
queer theorists should welcome any legal interventions that undermine
the naturalized status of heterosexuality.
By inserting an economic creditor/debtor model into heterosexual
marriage, PSAs do just this. Redefining primary homemakers as secured
creditors and primary wage-earners as debtors reveals the economic na-
ture of the transaction between these two players and inverts existing
power dynamics. It moreover subverts the dichotomous hierarchy of
market over family by importing market roles to the family relationship.
Investing politically and economically weak players (here, homemakers)
with the powerful attributes of a market player also erodes the hierarchy
of male power over women (sometimes masked as protectiveness) by
blurring the very boundaries between public and private, male and fe-
male, and market and family, that legitimate the hierarchy. By injecting
this economic model (and giving the homemaker the more powerful
role), PSAs also demonstrate that the complementary roles of gendered
domestic life are neither natural, essential, nor inevitable. Instead, they
are economic, and subject to regulation and change just as any other eco-
nomic institution.
PSAs further undermine the naturalized status of marriage by re-
vealing the performative nature of both gender and of heterosexuality.
85. BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 14, at 147.
86. The repetition is endless, since
[glender is a complexity whose totality is permanently deferred, never fully what it is at
any given juncture in time. An open coalition, then, will affirm identities that are
alternately instituted and relinquished according to the purposes at hand; it will be an
open assemblage that permits of multiple convergences and divergences without
obedience to a normative telos of definitional closure.
Id. at 16.
87. Butler, Imitation, supra note 14, at 21.
88. Id.
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Traditionally homemaker is constructed as married, female, and working
for love rather than remuneration. PSAs intervene in the perpetual repe-
tition of this homemaker role, adding the twists that the homemaker's
domestic labors are commodified and that she is a secured creditor.
Combining the (feminine) domestic role with the (masculine) market
accoutrements of a secured creditor, the creditor/homemaker role reveals
the constructed nature of domestic roles. Like a drag queen, the credi-
tor/homemaker "juxtapos[es] gender norms and gender deviance to de-
stabilize the whole structure." '89 The homemaker thus destabilizes the
symbiotic hierarchies of male/female and market/family. This new
creditor/homemaker identity contributes to a radical redefinition of both
male and female gender, and also demonstrates that there is nothing natu-
ral, biological, or essential about either gender or heterosexuality.
PSAs also could reflect the performativity of masculine gender roles
and have the practical impact of creating incentives for heterosexual men
(perhaps unwittingly) to further some objectives of queer theory. If
homemaking labor came with the security and status of a premarital se-
curity interest, perhaps more men would be interested in the job. PSAs
thus might contribute to the erosion of gender hierarchy by undermining
gendered specialization of labor in marriage. Once marriage strays from
gendered specialization, marriage is less gendered, and thus can more
easily accommodate same-sex couples. Feminists and queer theorists
have long recognized marriage's deeply patriarchal characteristics.' If
PSAs made men more likely to participate in homemaking (either pri-
marily or equally with their wives), then PSAs could further the queer
theoretical goal of undermining the cultural meaning of marriage (and
heterosexuality generally) as the only natural sexuality, grounded in
biologically based complementarity of sexual and gender roles.
89. Patriarchy Is Such a Drag, supra note 52, at 2004.
90. These inequalities in marriage are deeply rooted. Claude Levi-Strauss described marriage as
the exchange of women, a process in which women are gifts men give to one another to solidify male-
male alliances. See Gayle Rubin, The Traffic in Women: Notes on the "Political Economy" of Sex, in
TOWARD AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF WOMEN 157, 173 (Rayna R. Reiter ed., 1975) ("[M]arriages are a most
basic form of gift exchange, in which it is women who are the most precious of gifts." (articulating Levi-
Strauss's theory of marriage as a form of gift exchange)). Under this analysis of marriage rituals, women
are conduits to relationships between men rather than participants in the transaction, objects rather than
subjects. Id at 174 ("if it is women who are being transacted, then it is the men who give and take them
who are linked, the woman being a conduit of a relationship rather than a partner to it.") While Levi-
Strauss builds his argument that all kinship is based on men exchanging women from data gathered on
non-industrial societies, rennants of the exchange model persist in contemporary America. Many
married women do not participate in the wage labor force, marriage enhances men's market
potential, and women do the lion's share of housework even when they do work outside the home.
FUCHS, supra note 5, at 60, 83; HOCHSCHILD, supra note 5, at 8. The view of marriage as an
exchange between men is further supported by elements of contemporary marriage such as the bride
exchanging her father's last name for her husband's, and the father giving the bride to the husband
during the wedding ceremony.
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In sum, PSAs account for gender performativity by adding market
accoutrements to the domestic roles of primary homemaker and primary
wage-earner, and in doing so reveal that constructions of gendered labor
specialization (and attendant power differentials) in marriage are malle-
able rather than natural or essential. PSAs thus deconstruct and recon-
struct marriage by undermining doctrines which allocate family wealth at
divorce in a way that values only market labor and thus perpetuates both
homemaker dependency on primary wage-earners and the general de-
valuation of work deemed feminine. Remunerating "women's work"
would go a long way toward queering legal doctrine that currently re-
flects and constitutes hierarchies in which masculinity and heterosexual-
ity subordinate femininity and gay/lesbian existence.
2. Strategic Provisionality
In addition to incorporating gender performativity, PSAs are strate-
gically provisional. The fundamental instability of identity is central to
Butler's theory of gender performativity (and other poststructural ap-
proaches), and also central to queer theory. Yet legal theory relies heav-
ily on notions of identity, posing serious impediments to importing queer
theory into legal doctrine. A corporate officer's rights and duties, for
example, are dictated by her officer status. Other legal rights and obliga-
tions often turn on sexual orientation status: Marriage, for example, has
wide-ranging legal ramifications.9' Queer theorists have criticized legal
distinctions based on sexual orientation status as incoherent and illegiti-
mate.92 But it remains difficult to see how the law might recognize the
personhood of gay people without invoking the very identity categories
that queer theorists contend are instrumental to sexual orientation subor-
dination. If, for example, Congress passed the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act to amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
include sexual orientation as a prohibited basis for employment deci-
sions, this doctrinal change would simply add sexual orientation identity
to the list of other identities that are protected against employment dis-
crimination. PSAs might similarly graft creditor status onto the legal
construction of homemaker and reify gendered specialization of labor in
marriage."
Some theorists suggest that selective use of identity categories, re-
ferred to as strategic essentialism, accommodates pragmatic political
constraints while recognizing the power of queer theoretical deconstruc-
91. For a list of marital rights, duties, and entitlements, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE
CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 66-70 (1996).
92. See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity In and After Bowers
v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REv. 1721, 1747-48 (1993).
93. Kwan, supra note 11, at 1276-77 (warning against the dangers of reifying marginalized
identities through intersectional theory).
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tion of identity categories.' But most queer theorists warn that strategic
essentialism plays into power dynamics that disserve gay liberation' "
Butler suggests that strategic essentialism risks its own violence, because
in defining the members of any class who deserve protection against
discrimination, inevitably someone will be left out.' As an alternative to
strategic essentialism, Butler proposes strategic provisionality.97
Strategic provisionality involves using a sign in a way that does not
foreclose future uses of the sign.9" In other words, it recognizes the politi-
cal necessity of using particular terms to describe identity, but anticipates
that the identity's construction will change. In this way strategic provi-
sionality counteracts the set of exclusions inherent in any identity-based
classification by creating a status which is perpetually in flux. The ques-
tion is whether the deep-seated essentialism in legal theory and doctrine
can accommodate a changeable identity, one that is strategically provi-
sional.
Janet Halley persuasively contends that legal theorists must tran-
scend the impasse between essentialism and constructivism, and suggests
focusing instead on the common ground between the essentialist and
constructivist positions." In pointing out that both essentialist and con-
structivist positions can be used to argue for either pro-gay or anti-gay
94. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Histioragraphy, in
SELECTED SUBALTERN STUDIEs 3, 13-15 (Ranajit Guha & Gayatri Spivak eds., 1988). Judith Butler
anticipates a more hostile response to identity deconstruction in a series of questions:
But politically, we might argue, isn't it quite crucial to insist on lesbian and gay identities
precisely because they are being threatened with erasure and obliteration from
homophobic quarters? Isn't the above theory complicitous with those political forces that
would obliterate the possibility of gay and lesbian identity? Isn't it "no accident" that
such theoretical contestations of identity emerge within a political climate that is
performing a set of similar obliterations of homosexual identities through legal and
political means?
Butler, Imitation, supra note 14, at 19 (emphasis in original).
95. Richard Delgado offers an example of such a warning:
The price of strategic essentialism is not only that you get away from your agenda and
your heart-of-hearts goals. You'll develop what Antonio Gramsci calls false
consciousness. You'll forget who you are and what your original goals and commitments
were.... Spending time with Republicans means you will inevitably take on the mindset
of a Republican. A Black man active in a white-dominated civil rights organization will
eventually take on the traits and concerns he finds there. A Black woman working in a
male-dominated group will risk losing her identity as a Black feminist. Some social
scientists call this "alienation."
Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Sixth Chronicle: Intersections, Essences, and the Dilemma of Social
Reform, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 639, 653 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
96. Butler, Imitation, supra note 14, at 19 ("[A]ny consolidation of identity requires some set
of differentiations and exclusions.").
97. Id. ("In avowing the sign's strategic provisionality (rather than its strategic essentialism),
that identity can become a site of contest and revision, indeed, take on a future set of significations
that those of us who use it now may not be able to foresee.").
98. Id.
99. Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the
Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 506 (1994).
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policies,'" Halley urges that pro-gay legal advocates abandon biological
determinism and focus instead on "legal strategies that emphasize the
political dynamics that inevitably attend sexual orientation identity-no
matter how it is caused."'' °
In simultaneously entertaining identity and mutability, Halley's
argument employs strategic provisionality. She proposes a "weak be-
havioral constructivism" which accommodates both essentialist and con-
structivist approaches:
Those pre-committed to same-sex contacts might be pederasts, sodo-
mites, mollies, berdache, inverts, homosexuals, gay men, lesbians,
queers and so on. People's subjective experience of sexuality, and the
behavior they undertake to support it, would be radically contingent
on the identity offered by their culture for persons of their object
choice and on their own opportunities for altering or shaping the op-
tions on offer.'°2
In other words, Halley's behavioral constructivism and Butler's strategic
provisionality both seek to focus on political implications of culture
rather than an essential, fixed identity to counteract gendered and hetero-
sexualized power dynamics.
PSAs recognize some of these insights. They are deliberately ag-
nostic about gender and seek to alter the construction of heterosexuality.
In Butler's terms, PSAs do not foreclose "the future uses of the sign"'' 3
homemaker. Instead, they intervene in the current construction of gen-
dered labor specialization in marriage as natural, transforming home-
maker into a hybrid of domestic and market elements. Because PSAs
anticipate that the reallocation of power and wealth in heterosexual
families might change the allocation of domestic and market labor in
marriage, they deliberately anticipate a fluctuating construction of
homemaker.
In Halley's terms, PSAs make "[p]eople's subjective experience of
sexuality, and the behavior they undertake to support it ... [here, gen-
dered specialization of labor in marriage] radically contingent on the
identity offered by their culture for persons of their object choice."'"
Here, PSAs offer the cultural debtor/creditor roles to supplement the
traditional wage-earner/homemaker roles. If homemaker has the cultural
meanings associated with domesticity in which one labors for love rather
than remuneration, then the subjective experience of heterosexual mar-
riage is one of complementary roles in which market and home are both
100. Id. at 517 (pointing out that "[n]either essentialism nor constructivism is necessarily gay-
affirmative") (emphasis added)).
101. ld.at506.
102. ld. at 561.
103. Butler, Imitation, supra note 14, at 19 (emphasis omitted).
104. Halley, supra note 99, at 561.
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necessary, but market is culturally superior because labor there is re-
warded with pay. If, however, homemaker is supplemented with some
market characteristics by making the primary homemaker a secured
creditor in relation to her primary wage-earning spouse, then the mean-
ing of homemaker changes dramatically. This switch demonstrates that
there is nothing natural, essential, prepolitical or inevitable about home-
making being unremunerated and less powerful. As such, PSAs treat
gender and (heterosexual) sexual orientation as radically contingent on
cultural forces.' 5
In sum, PSAs have the potential to queer marriage doctrine by both
reflecting the insights of gender performativity and by being strategically
provisional. By dressing homemakers as secured creditors and primary
wage-earners as debtors, PSAs reveal the constructed nature of both gen-
der roles and of traditional heterosexual marriage itself. They thus inter-
vene in the current constructions of both gender and heterosexuality to
undermine naturalized constructions. PSAs moreover implement Butler's
strategic provisionality and Halley's behavioral constructivism in their
simultaneous use of the categories homemaker and creditor in relation to
the same subject and their refusal to essentialize any particular under-
standing of sex, gender, or sexual orientation (or, for that matter, debtor
or creditor).
C. Premarital Security Agreements Might Queer the State
Lisa Duggan's influential essay Queering the State urges queer
theorists to engage on both theoretical and practical levels by importing
the insights of queer theory into mainstream debate, emphasizing that
"we need.., to be both transformative and effective."'" As Duggan ac-
knowledges, though, there are significant barriers to direct importation.
She illustrates this point by imagining a Nightline panel with prominent
queer theorists discussing the military's ban on gay service members:
105. Another level of strategic provisionality turns on PSAs' deliberate agnosticism about
essentialist or constructivist understandings of sex and gender. As I describe at length in
Commercializing Marriage, supra note 4, PSAs have the potential to either encourage or discourage
traditional gender roles in marriage. Part of the reason that PSAs enjoy this flexibility (or, to put it
negatively, indeterminacy) is that their predicted effects are determined by assumptions about sex
and gender. If, for example, traditional gender roles are biologically determined (perhaps as a matter
of sociobiological determination to maximize the chances that one's genes will be replicated in
future gene pools), then women should play traditional roles regardless of legal incentives to do
otherwise. Traditionalist legal economists take this position. If, on the other hand, gender is socially
constructed and thus can be restructured based on legal incentives (as most feminists contend), then,
given the right incentives, women might venture out into the wage labor force in a more focused way
than many currently do. PSAs are malleable enough to accommodate both of these positions. Gender
may be determined or not, and PSAs will protect the people (male or female) who play caretaking
roles in marriage and family life. Thus, although Butler might object to PSAs' ability to
accommodate essentialist notions of gender, she might appreciate their ability to serve both
essentialist and constructionist notions of gender, thereby destabilizing either side's claim to truth.
106. Duggan, supra note 2, at 193.
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It is not that these figures would have nothing interesting or useful to
say. They would simply have a great deal of trouble making them-
selves understood (as many of us in the field of queer studies would).
The problems are on the levels both of cultural legibility and political
palatability. Imagine Bersani: "As I argue, Ted, in my article 'Is the
Rectum A Grave?' . . . The ensuing discussion of heteromasculinity's
terror of penetration might put Ted in his grave."' '
Because, as discussed above, PSAs import the insights of queer theory
and also are mainstream in their focus on the value of homemaking,
PSAs bridge this gap between theory and practice. PSAs might turn out
to be both transformative and effective: transformative in the way they
cohere with queer theory insights about gender performativity and strate-
gic provisionality, and effective in their practical redistributive effects.
PSAs, in short, appropriate liberal discourses toward radical ends.
As an example of appropriating liberal discourse to serve radical
ends, Duggan suggests that queer activists borrow the liberal discourse of
disestablishmentarianism in order to divert homophobic assaults on gay
men and lesbians. Specifically, she suggests queer theorists and activists
appropriate liberal arguments against a state-established religion to sug-
gest that the state similarly separate itself from "the religion of hetero-
normativity."' Duggan explains that this strategy (which she dubs "No
Promo Hetero"') is "not a broad solution, but only a local tactic embed-
ded in a larger strategy of destabilizing heteronormativity. It is one
among many conceivable tactics.""0 Like Duggan's No Promo Hetero
proposal, PSAs focus on heterosexuality, and apply queer theory to legal
doctrine regulating heterosexuality. As such, they deconstruct heterosexu-
ality first, attacking its naturalized position directly rather than by decon-
structing gay and lesbian identities that are already marked as marginal."'
Duggan suggests that appropriating liberal discourse with a queer
theory twist answers the need for "a less defensive, more politically self-
assertive set of linguistic and conceptual tools to talk about sexual differ-
ence."' 2 PSAs respond to the need for offensive rather than defensive
approaches. Duggan urges queer theorists to apply high theory strategi-
cally, and activists to think beyond formal equality, in both cases bor-
rowing from liberal discourses to redirect the debate about queer human-
107. Id. at 183.
108. Id. at 189.
109. Id. at 188. Nan Hunter coined the phrase "No Promo Homo" to describe and critique
"state-imposed penalties on identity speech--or speech that promotes or professes homosexuality."
Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech and Equality, in SEX WARS, supra note 2, at 140. Duggan takes
Hunter's insights a step further, suggesting that the state should adopt a policy of No Promo Hetero
instead of merely refraining from suppressing the promotion of homosexuality.
110. Duggan, supra note 2, at 191-92.
111. See id. at 185.
112. Id. at 192. However, while Duggan focuses on the differences between heterosexuals and
gay people, PSAs focus on the different situations of men and women in marriage.
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ity's subject status."3 Duggan is not suggesting that liberal discourse is
the key to replacing heteronormativity with queer sensibilities, but rather
that it is one way to translate the often arcane language of queer theory
into mainstream discourse:
The question is: At this historical moment, can we transform any lib-
eral rhetoric in the interests ultimately of going beyond liberal catego-
ries and solutions? Or, given the difficulty of translating our most
radical insights and arguments into effective discourse, can we afford
not to try?"'
PSAs similarly are not everything to everyone, but they have the poten-
tial to radically restructure the way we think about marriage and gender
roles, and thus make some headway toward queer theory's goal of de-
constructing "the natural and preferred status of heterosexuality.""'5
D. Premarital Security Agreements Are Doctrinal Interventions in Con-
flations of Sex, Gender, and Sexual Orientation
A trilogy of recent articles similarly strives for an understanding of
legal theory and doctrine that is both effective and transformative. In
these articles Mary Anne Case,"6 Katherine Franke,"7 and Frank Valdes"'
have made important contributions to legal theoretical understanding of
the intersections (or inter-connections) between sex, gender and sexual
orientation."9 Given that PSAs, too, strive to transform legal theory and
doctrine as well as to achieve practical change benefiting marginalized
people, the approaches of Case, Franke, and Valdes offer a yardstick for
evaluating PSAs' relevance for queer legal theory. The depth and com-
plexity of each scholar's approach justify a full article exploring the re-
lationship among them, but such detail is beyond the scope of this essay.
The purpose of this essay is instead to engage in a brief, inevitably re-
ductionist, examination of how PSAs might cohere (or conflict) with
Case's, Franke's, and Valdes's approaches to intersectionality.
One can read the Case, Franke, and Valdes trio of articles as advo-
cating for an expanded understanding of sex discrimination law to in-
clude gender and/or sexual orientation discrimination. At this level, there
is reason to believe that all three approaches may resonate with PSAs.
113. Duggan, supra. note 2, at 181-86.
114. Id. at 193.
115. Id. at 190.
116. Case, supra note 16.
117. Franke, supra note 16.
118. Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys, supra note 16.
119. While there is substantial overlap between their approaches, each can be said to focus on a
different point in the triangle of sex, gender, and sexual orientation: Case on gender, Franke on sex,
and Valdes on orientation. Case, supra note 16, at 105 n.39.
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While Case, Franke, and Valdes all promote an expansive under-
standing of sex discrimination law that protects people from gender and
sexual orientation as well as sex discrimination, each scholar takes a
unique approach. The crux of Case's argument is that femininity (ex-
pressed by men or by women) should be protected." Franke argues for
an expanded understanding of sexual identity that goes beyond biology
to include "a more behavioral or performative conception of sex."'2 ' Val-
des contends that the law tolerates a great deal of sex and gender dis-
crimination by labeling it sexual orientation discrimination.22 A synthesis
of Case's, Franke's and Valdes's approaches suggests that anti-
discrimination law inaccurately perceives overlap and separation among
sex, gender, and sexual orientation, and that it should instead understand
sex discrimination to include protection for effeminate men, people
whose gender does not match their sex, and gay people. PSAs share
some commonality with all three approaches.
Case favors protecting those who exhibit feminine behavior from
discrimination, reasoning that the world will be safe for women in "frilly
pink dresses" when it is safe for men in dresses."n PSAs protect men as
well as women who engage in homemaking, an activity which is argua-
bly as feminine as wearing a dress.' PSAs moreover add a masculine
(market) element to feminine homemaking conduct to remedy the fman-
cial straits of displaced homemakers and to increase the social value of
women's work generally. Not unlike Case's proposal for protecting ef-
feminate men in order to increase the social value ascribed to
femininity,"n PSAs alter the social meaning of homemaking by quanti-
fying its contribution to family wealth and protecting the primary home-
maker's interest in that investment with a security interest. If the in-
120. Case contends that Title VII "correctly applied, already provide[s] the necessary protection
to both effeminate men and feminine women, as well as their masculine counterparts." Case, supra
note 16, at 4.
121. Franke, supra note 16, at 8.
122. Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys, supra note 16, at 17.
123. Case, supra note 16, at 7 ("It is my contention that, unfortunately, the world will not be
safe for women in frilly pink dresses-they will not, for example, generally be as respected as either
men or women in gray flannel suits-unless and until it is made safe for men in dresses as well.").
124. One could argue that dresses are unambiguous markers of femininity, while homemaking
is behavior that both women and men engage in, albeit in varying degrees. In other words, a married
father could leave the practice of law to teach secondary school in order to have more time with his
children, and retain social ascriptions of masculinity. If, however, this same man substituted a golf
skirt for khakis, or started sporting pearls, he would be subject to social penalties for transgressing
sex/gender norms. This comparison may illustrate the differential penalties for various types of
demasculinazation. The former lawyer may suffer economically for his family-driven career change,
but also benefit socially both from the deeper relationship with his family and from social value
ascribed to those men who demonstrate dedication to their families. The cross-dressing man,
however, suffers both socially and economically, indicating that the sartorial elements of gender
normativity may be stronger than those associated with participation in homemaking and wage-
labor. See MARJORtE GARBER, VESTED INTERESTS: CROSS-DRESSING AND CuLTuRAL ANxtETY 52-
66 (1992) (analyzing historical examples of cross-dressing).
125. See Case, supra note 16, at 4.
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creased economic and social valuation of homemaking induces some
men to increase the time they devote to caring for their families, then
PSAs could further contribute to the valuation of so-called women's
work because more men would be doing it.'" Thus, reforms which make
the world safe for people (men or women) in aprons share the spirit of
reforms that make it safe for anyone who wants to wear a frilly dress. In
both cases, social roles that are stigmatized as feminine are redefined as
at least partly masculine, and thus more valuable both socially and eco-
nomically.
While Case seeks to value femininity by protecting men who exhibit
it, Franke seeks to expand (and perhaps replace) the understanding of sex
to include what we commonly think of as gender.'27 She contends that
biological notions of sex allow considerable gender discrimination to go
unchecked because "most, if not all, differences between men and
women are grounded not in biology, but in gender normativity."'' ' Franke
prefers an understanding of sex discrimination that protects, in addition
to transgendered people, "the male senior associate in a law firm who
wants neither to be ridiculed by his male colleagues nor penalized when
he comes up for partner because he requests time off from work to care
for his newborn child."'" Thus, Franke wants the law to account for gen-
der performativity by protecting against discrimination based on gender
normativity.3 °
Just as PSAs cohere with Case's argument that sex discrimination
law should protect effeminate men, PSAs are consistent with Franke's
suggestion that sex discrimination law should remedy injuries suffered as
a result of hostility to gender non-conformity. 3 As discussed above,
PSAs are consistent with Butler's theory of gender performativity, a the-
ory which also informs Franke's approach.'32 PSAs account for the per-
formativity of gender in the context of a traditional marriage. Under a
PSA the primary homemaker's contributions to family wealth are recog-
126. While it is not clear whether "the feminine tend[s] to be devalued because it is associated
with women, or... women [are] devalued because they manifest feminine characteristics," Case
mines cross-cultural evidence to suggest that the "the stronger line of causation runs from a
disfavoring of women." Case, supra note 16, at 33. Thus "feminine characteristics are devalued
relative to masculine ones, to the detriment not only of men displaying those feminine characteristics
but of women generally." Id. at 28.
127. Franke, supra note 16, at 3 ("[S]exual identity-that is, what it means to be a woman and
what it means to be a man-must be understood not in deterministic, biological terms, but according
to a set of behavioral, performative norms.").
128. Id. at 5.
129. Id. at 8-9.
130. Franke makes the important clarification that gender performativity does not mean that
one dons a gender in the morning like an outfit; to the contrary, Butler's theory of gender
performativity "regards gender norms as part of what determines the subject. As such, construction
is a constitutive constraint." Id. at 50-51 n.211.
131. Id. at 1-3.
132. Id. at 51-58.
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nized and remunerated by making the homemaker a secured creditor and
her primary wage-earning spouse a debtor. This change reveals that the
homemaker/wage-earner dyad is not natural, but rather economic and
changeable. When homemakers are also secured creditors, heterosexual-
ity itself is reconstructed as an economic, rather than natural, relation-
ship. By combining these market and domestic roles, PSAs offer a way
of thinking about marriage that is gendered rather than sexed, and in do-
ing so support sex and gender equality. PSAs thus cohere with Franke's
focus on a performative notion of sex and gender.
Just as PSAs are consistent with Case's focus on femininity and
Franke's focus on gender performativity, PSAs also cohere with Valdes's
focus on sexual orientation discrimination. Valdes argues that gender and
sex discrimination often go undetected and unpunished when they seem
to take the form of sexual orientation discrimination.'33 He proposes a
triangular model in which sex, gender, and sexual orientation interact,
and suggests that the legs of this triangle reveal legal and social confla-
tions between the categories.' Valdes's point is that the law perpetuates
compulsory heterosexuality through these conflations.'3
Valdes's approach presupposes the desirability of legal doctrines
which destabilize androsexism and heterosexism.'36 PSAs do just that.
PSAs reconstruct the category wife, which currently is sexed woman,
gendered female, and presupposes a heterosexual orientation. Under
PSAs, wife becomes less gendered female when it is merged with the
gendered male (market) category of secured creditor, because home-
making work is no longer done for only love but receives remuneration
just as market labor does. Once wife becomes less gendered female, per-
haps men will be less reluctant to engage in caretaking behavior, and
wife may even come to represent the activities of caretaking rather than
the sex of the person doing the homemaking. Finally, if wife ceases to be
constructed as sexed and gendered female, then marriage itself undergoes
a reconstruction. It would no longer be defined as requiring one gen-
dered/sexed male and one gendered/sexed female, instead requiring two
people engaged in wage labor and homemaking, perhaps equally and
perhaps in a specialized way.
The reconstruction of marriage through PSAs could ultimately
benefit many gay people. If PSAs replaced the current gendered focus of
133. See Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys, supra note 16, at 17.
134. Id. at 13; Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy, supra note 16, at 165.
135. Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys, supra note 16, at 42; Valdes, Unpacking
Hetero-Patriarchy, supra note 16, at 169 ("[T]he conflationary status quo represents a regime of
compulsory hetero-patriarchy.").
136. See Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy, supra note 16 at 162-63 (contending that the
critique of the Euro-American sex/gender system as neither ahistorical nor universal allows "critical
reconsideration of the legal value of human desire and intimacy," and that such a critique could
contribute to "chang[ing] law from an instrument of sex/gender oppression to an engine for
sex/gender liberation").
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marriage with an economic one, then PSAs also could contribute to a
social climate in which same-sex marriage is no longer oxymoronic. In
other words, if marriage is an economic relationship in which two people
align to pool their economic and emotional resources (rather than pri-
marily to beget and raise children in traditionally gendered roles),'37 then
the ban on same-sex marriage loses much of its purpose. Thus PSAs of-
fer a legal doctrine that intervenes in the conflation of sex, gender, and
sexual orientation that Valdes posits is key to the subordination of
women and sexual minorities.'38
In sum, PSAs may queer legal theory by intervening in law's cur-
rent conflation of sex, gender, and sexual orientation. By treating pri-
mary homemakers as secured creditors, they alleviate the indigency of
displaced homemakers and value women's work. Moreover, PSAs co-
here with Case's, Franke's, and Valdes's theoretical and doctrinal ap-
proaches to sex discrimination by counteracting economic penalties cur-
rently exacted on those who perform the feminine labor of homemaking,
understanding gender as performative, and intervening in the construc-
tion of wife as sexed and gendered female and heterosexual. These ef-
fects are largely gender-related, but PSAs also contribute to a social and
legal construction of marriage that could include same-sex marriage.
E. Premarital Security Agreements Could Contribute to the Push for
Same-Sex Marriage
William Eskridge has articulately made the case for same-sex mar-
riage.'39 If PSAs focus on economic aspects of marriage (and downplay
its gendered aspects), then they may contribute to creating a social cli-
mate capable of recognizing same-sex marriage. Mainstream opposition
to same-sex marriage stems from a belief that it undermines the natural
order of things, which is taken to be the state recognizing only those re-
lationships between men and women entered into for the primary pur-
137. The legislative history of the Defense of Marriage Act (D.O.M.A.) illustrates this
construction of traditional heterosexual marriage. The House Report in support of the D.O.M.A.
included the following statement: "Marriage is the central cultural recourse for reconciling men and
women's separate natures and different reproductive strategies. Indeed, the most important purpose
of marriage is to unite men and women in a formal partnership that will last through the prolonged
period of dependency of a human child." H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 14 n.50 (1996), reprinted in
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2918 n.50 (quoting Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, The War Between the
Sexes, 7 Am. ENTERPRISE 26 (1996)). Hadley Arkes, Edward Ney Professor of Jurisprudence and
American Institutions, Amherst College similarly testified:
[Slexuality [is] imprinted on our very natures-in the obdurate fact that we are, as the
saying goes, "engendered." We are, each of us, born a man or a woman .... Our
engendered existence, as men and women, offers the most unmistakable, natural signs of
the meaning and purpose of sexuality. And that is to say the function and purpose of
begetting.
Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing on H.R. 3396 Before the Subcomm. of the House CommL on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 99-100 (1996) (testimony of Hadley Arkes).
138. Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy, supra note 16, at 163.
139. ESKRIDGE, supra note 91; Eskridge, supra note 17, at 1419.
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pose of begetting and raising children.'" As long as marriage is con-
structed in this highly sexed and gendered way, same-sex marriage will
remain oxymoronic.'" If PSAs contribute to a legal regulation of mar-
riage that focuses on economics rather than traditional gender roles,
however, same-sex marriage makes more sense. Thus PSAs, despite their
potential to reward wives in traditionally gendered marriages,' could
paradoxically have the effect of contributing to social conditions that
would allow for social recognition of same-sex marriage. While gay mar-
riage is one of the most prominent items on the national agenda for gay
rights, given the possibility that some states might lift the ban on same-
143sex marriage, numerous commentators have suggested that there are
significant pitfalls with putting gay marriage at the top of a gay rights
agenda.
F. Queer Theory Qualms About Same-Sex Marriage
Darren Hutchinson is one of many queer theorists to suggest that
same-sex marriage may not be everything it is cracked up to be.'"
140. See supra note 137 (describing the legislative history of the Defense of Marriage Act).
141. Same-sex marriage may make more sense in many people's minds as the baby boom in the
gay and lesbian community (dubbed the "gayby boom") takes hold in primary schools, emergency
rooms, family law courts, and other arenas around the country. The idea of gay couples having
children has penetrated the popular imagination through celebrity couples such as Melissa Etheridge
and Julie Cypher, who demonstrated generous openness when they had publicly discussed their
decision to have a child together. See Mark Miller, We're a Family and We Have Rights,
NEWSWEEK, Nov. 4, 1996, at 54 (interviewing Melissa Etheridge and Julie Cypher). Once a critical
mass of run-of-the-mill gay and lesbian couples begin interacting with PTA boards, school teachers,
hospitals, and other social actors, parenthood may cease to be understood as unique to opposite sex
couples. For further discussion of the way that the gayby boom could influence PSAs' applicability
to same-sex couples, see infra Part Il.
142. See Ertman, Commercializing Marriage, supra note 4.
143. This possibility became remote when Hawaii voters amended their constitution to
authorize the state legislature to ban same-sex marriage. Sam Howe Verhovek, The 1998 Elections:
The States-Intitiatives, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1998, at 1. Alaska voters similarly intervened in
marriage litigation by amending their constitution to define marriage as a union between a man and a
woman. Id. However, same-sex marriage litigation continues in Vermont. See Gustav Niebuhr, Laws
Aside, Some in Clergy Quietly Bless Gay "Marriage," N.Y. TIMES, April 17, 1998, at Al.
144. See Hutchinson, supra note 59, at 586-602; see also Ruth Colker, Marriage, 3 YALE J.L.
& FEMINISM 321, 326 (1991) ("[W]e should work to change the definition of family and the
exclusive class-based ways that our society provides privileges, rather than encourage more
people-gay or straight-to enter the institution of marriage."); Paula L. Ettelbrick, Legal Marriage
Is Not the Answer, HARV. GAY & LESBIAN REv., Fall 1997, at 34 (arguing that "the battle for legal
marriage is too narrow and too limited for our own community's interests, and that in pursuing it as
our primary political objective we will rob ourselves of an important opportunity to challenge
heterocentric sexual and family hierarchies"); Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For:
Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in
Every Marriage," 79 VA. L. REv. 1535, 1536 (1993) ("[T]he desire to marry in the lesbian and gay
community is an attempt to mimic the worst of mainstream society, an effort to fit into an inherently
problematic institution that betrays the promise of both lesbian and gay liberation and radical
feminism."); Charles R. P. Pouncy, Marriage and Domestic Partnership: Rationality and Inequality,
7 TEMPLE POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REV. 363, 370 (1998) ("The extension of same-sex marriage will
cloak gay and lesbian couples in the traditions of patriarchy and heterosexism. Heterosexual norms
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Hutchinson makes a powerful argument that focusing on marriage ig-
nores the interests of many gays and lesbians of color and those who are
poor. In other words, claims that gay people are "virtually normal,"
needing only marriage to bring them into the mainstream, misapprehend
and further marginalize the experiences of many gay people.145
Hutchinson argues that upper middle class white men would benefit
more from marriage than many gay people of color and gay poor people.
Specifically, he notes that the paradigmatic model of family as two
spouses and their biological children overlooks the fact that "Africans,
American blacks, and other non-white cultures place tremendous impor-
tance on 'extended families,' rather than rigid nuclear bodies."'" Moreo-
ver, he points out that poor gay people would not be able to take advan-
tage of many economic benefits of marriage. 4 ' Thus PSAs' focus on
middle and upper middle class couples, coupled with some queer theo-
rists' lack of enthusiasm about PSAs' potential to contribute to paving
the path toward legal recognition of same-sex relationships, could pre-
vent a number of queer theorists from embracing PSAs.
There is good reason to suspect that PSAs might exacerbate rather
than alleviate the marginalization of poor people and many people of
color. PSAs are based on a paradigmatic marriage comprised of a pri-
mary wage-earner and a primary homemaker where the wage-earner
earns considerably higher wages than the homemaker. This model ap-
plies best in white middle and upper-middle class marriages, and has less
applicability in communities of color where wage differences between
men and women are less extreme than those between white men and
women. 148 Moreover, women of color (both historically and currently) are
more likely to participate in the wage labor force than white women,
often doing domestic labor for wages.' 9 Finally, poor women are more
likely to marry poor men, making the redistribution of wage-earner in-
come from men to women largely illusory for many women. For these
reasons, there is reason to question whether PSAs can be said to be inter-
SEXional given their modest interventions in (and possible support of)
class and race hierarchies.
These concerns merit serious consideration. While PSAs may work
best in white middle and upper-middle class marriages, they may also
improve ,on current legal treatment of many people of color and poor
people. First, the race and class critique applies to any post-divorce in-
will become the standards applied to lesbian and gay relationships, and the development of queer
cultural constructions of intimate relationships will be stunted.").
145. Hutchinson, supra note 59, at 597-98.
146. See id. at 592 (footnote omitted).
147. See id. at 593.
148. Brown, supra note 24, at 795-96; Perry, supra note 24, at 2486; see also Ertman,
Commercializing Marriage, supra note 4, at 104-05.
149. Perry, supra note 24, at 2487-98; Dorothy E. Roberts, Spiritual and Menial Housework, 9
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 51 (1997).
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come sharing proposal, suggesting that if these considerations prevent
PSAs from queering legal theory then they would also prevent much
privatized divorce reform from reconstructing marriage. Such an ap-
proach might overlook substantial benefits of PSAs that could outweigh
these problems.
First, marriage likely has beneficial as well as marginalizing impli-
cations for poor people and many people of color. It might, for example,
benefit some poor people who currently do not avail themselves of it.
Cynthia Bowman has argued, for example, that common law marriage
should be revitalized to protect the interests of poor women and many
women of color who would not otherwise be entitled to enjoy state bene-
fits such as Social Security and worker's compensation death benefits.5
PSAs also could benefit middle, upper-middle, and working class women
of color since women of color are much less likely to be awarded ali-
mony than white women."' Moreover, PSAs could benefit many low-
income women who would otherwise bear more than their share of
marital debt upon divorce. If PSAs were treated as securing a debt of the
primary wage-earner (or the non-homemaker if neither spouse is fully
employed) to the primary homemaker, this marital debt could off-set the
primary homemaker's liability for other marital debts.' 2 Finally, on a
macro level, PSAs could benefit the many poor women who perform
domestic labor in other people's homes by increasing the social and eco-
nomic value of that labor. 3 If PSAs increase the overall value of domes-
tic labor, then they could result in an increase in the wages of domestic
workers.
This survey of selected queer theoretical approaches suggests that
PSAs have the potential to queer existing doctrine through an interSEX-
ional approach. They have the potential to undermine compulsory het-
erosexuality, reflect a performative understanding of gender, queer the
state, intervene in legal conflations of sex, gender, and sexual orientation,
and contribute to the social and legal fight for same-sex marriage. While
they may also inadvertently be manipulated to support compulsory het-
erosexuality by rewarding women in traditional gendered marriages and
ratifying race and class hierarchies, these drawbacks should not prevent
queer theorists from seriously considering PSAs as one doctrinal tool for
150. See Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law Marriage,
75 OR. L. REv. 709, 762 (1997). Bowman discusses the racialized history of the repeal of common
law marriage, including Louisiana's treatment of common law marriage in order to discourage
manumission of slaves through liaisons between white men and female slaves. See id. at 737.
151. Perry, supra note 24, at 2483 (describing 1987 Census Bureau statistics that 18 percent of
white women were awarded alimony, compared to less than 8 percent of African American women).
152. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage, supra note 4, at 105. Nancy Staudt similarly proposes
to tax housework and create a household income tax credit. Nancy Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84
GEO. L.J. 1571, 1630-31 (1996).
153. Achieving this goal would require that PSAs also intervene in the dichotomy between
spiritual and menial housework, so that all homemaking would be commodified and valued. See
Roberts, supra note 149.
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queering legal theory by reconstructing marriage. Even if queer theorists
reject PSAs, queer theorists should consider other proposals which aim
to alter the unmarked, heterosexual categories prior to (or contemporane-
ously with) deconstructing gay/lesbian/bisexual, transgendered, and
transsexual identity categories.
IIIH. PREMARITAL SECURITY AGREEMENTS IN SAME-SEX
RELATIONSHIPS
Perhaps the most practical question for queer theorists who examine
PSAs is whether PSAs would apply to same-sex relationships. While
PSAs are modeled on heterosexual marriages (and traditionalist ones at
that), they could be tailored to remunerate homemaking in gay and les-
bian families. Differences between same-sex and heterosexual partner-
ships, however, suggest that PSAs might function better as the exception
than as the rule in same-sex relationships.
One problem with directly importing PSAs to same-sex relation-
ships is that PSAs are premised on a model of gendered specialization of
labor in marriage. If lesbians and gay men are less specialized in their
domestic roles, PSAs may have less applicability for gay and lesbian
relationships than they do in heterosexual relationships. Empirical re-
search suggests that same-sex relationships do tend to be less gendered
than heterosexual ones,"' so remunerating homemaking through PSAs
simply might not reflect the typical same-sex relationship dynamic.
Research on how couples divide household chores indicates that
lesbian and gay households tend to be less gendered in this way than
heterosexual ones. This pattern is not surprising given the fact that, by
definition, neither partner in a same-sex relationship is "the" man or
"the" woman, so that tasks cannot be divided on those grounds. Perhaps
because of this dynamic (coupled with many lesbians' feminism), lesbian
154. See PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES: MONEY, WORK, SEX
148-51 (1983) (suggesting that "same-sex couples cannot assign housework on the basis of who is
male and who is female"); Lawrence A. Kurdek, The Allocation of Household Labor in Gay,
Lesbian, and Heterosexual Married Couples, 49 J. SOC. ISSUES, Fall 1993, at 127, 138 (finding that
gay and lesbian couples allocate household labor on bases other than gender); see also Janet Lever,
Lesbian Sex Survey, ADVOCATE, Aug. 22, 1995, at 22. The Advocate survey indicates:
There is very little evidence that images of masculinity or femininity relate to who takes
the role of sexual aggressor within relationships. Who does the cooking is also unrelated
to relative butch-femme ratings, but there is a strong correspondence to who does more
driving--even being just somewhat more masculine than a partner puts one behind the
wheel far more often.
Id. at 28. This data from the Advocate survey should, however, be taken in the context of
respondents' demographics: The average age was 34; 86 percent of the respondents were white
(compared to 8 percent Hispanic/Latina, 2 percent African American or black, 1 percent Native
American, 1 percent Asian, and 2 percent "other"); nearly two-thirds had at least a college degree
and more than 25 percent had a graduate degree (compared to 14 percent of American women
holding a bachelor's degree and 6 percent having an advanced degree); and the average personal
income was $32,000. Id. at 25.
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and gay couples tend to "strive for egalitarian relationships," and are less
marked by power imbalances than heterosexual relationships.' This
situation is further facilitated by the fact that same-sex partners tend to
have similar options for wage labor, and thus are relative financial
equals. As a result of these factors, housework is negotiated rather than
sex-based, and same-sex partners tend to compensate one partner who
expends more time on homemaking labor."6
A related difference between heterosexual and same-sex couples is
that same-sex couples generally expect both partners to be self-
supporting.'57 While gay men seem somewhat more tolerant of playing
the provider role than lesbians are, same-sex couples generally are more
stable when both partners contribute equally or proportionately to the
household.' Although same-sex couples tend to share homemaking and
wage-earning tasks more equally than heterosexual partners, in both
kinds of relationships there is a direct relationship between hours worked
in the wage labor market and the amount of homemaking a partner does.
In other words, the partner who works more does less homemaking. 9
This common pattern suggests that PSAs might be most justified in the
same-sex relationship context where one partner is less than fully em-
ployed for a significant period of time. Raising a child could be one of
the circumstances in which this type of pattern might emerge in same-sex
relationships.
However, having children seems to be more the exception than the
rule in same-sex relationships.'" As such, assuming that childcare (actual
155. See Michelle Huston & Pepper Schwartz, The Relationships of Lesbians and Gay Men, in
UNDER-STUDIED RELATIONSHIPS: OFF THE BEATEN TRACK 89, 108-11 (Julia T. Wood & Steve
Duck eds., 1995). But see Nancy E. Murphy, Note, Queer Justice: Equal Protection for Victims of
Same-Sex Domestic Violence, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 335, 340 & nn.34, 36 (citing CLAIRE M.
RENZETTI, VIOLENT BETRAYAL: PARTNER ABUSE IN LESBIAN RELATIONSHIPS (1992) in asserting
that domestic violence in same-sex relationships occurs with the same frequency and in a similar
manner as domestic violence occurring in opposite-sex relationships).
156. Huston & Schwartz, supra note 155, at 108-11.
157. In particular,
Both gay and lesbian partners will engage in the provider role, but they each prefer a co-
provider situation. Gay men, like other men, do not expect that a provider will take care
of them. When one gay partner is the provider, the partner who is being provided for
tends to be more dissatisfied with the situation. In contrast, lesbians do not expect to
support another person financially, except temporarily. Lesbians are not socialized, as
many men are, to take pleasure in a paternalistic provider role. A lesbian who finds
herself in the role of provider is likely to be the more dissatisfied partner with the
situation.
Virginia Rutter & Pepper Schwartz, Same-Sex Couples: Courtship, Commitment, Context, in THE
DIVERSITY OF HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS 197, 209 (Ann Elisabeth Auhagen & Maria von Salisch eds.,
1996).
158. Id.
159. BLUMSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 154, at 148-49.
160. Given the legal and social hostility to gay people caring for children, it is difficult to
calculate the number of gay and lesbian parents. Certainly the number of same-sex couples with
children seems to be on the rise. See supra note 141. But even if gay parenting is becoming
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or anticipated) is a major reason that many married women devote pri-
mary attention to homemaking, perhaps it makes sense for PSAs to be
the rule in heterosexual marriages and the exception in same-sex rela-
tionships. In either situation the spouses could contract around the rule
(either by earning equivalent wages or through an express waiver of the
PSA). Given that PSAs are firmly grounded in gendered allocations of
homemaking and wage labor in most marriages, this differential applica-
tion of PSAs makes more sense than applying them to all couples in the
same way.'6 ' In any case, PSAs would not make much of a difference for
most same-sex couples because the partners earn roughly equivalent
wages, so that the formula for calculating the debt due to one partner as
remuneration for specializing in homemaking would yield modest, if
any, payments.
An additional barrier to applying PSAs to same-sex relationships is
that, unlike heterosexual marriage, no state currently provides rules for
either creating or dissolving gay or lesbian relationships (let alone the
distribution of property or payment of alimony). States would have to
recognize same-sex relationships before they could administer break-ups
and apply the PSA as appropriate. Some states are moving in that direc-
tion with marriage litigation6' and reciprocal beneficiaries legislation,
163
and other states, including Colorado, are exploring what kind of legisla-
tion should govern same-sex relationships.'" It is important to note that
state recognition of same-sex marriage (or domestic partnerships or re-
ciprocal beneficiary relationships) does not dispose of the issue of
whether such relationships should be governed by PSAs. Given the
above discussion of the relative equality of partners in same-sex relation-
ships, perhaps reverse default rules should govern heterosexual and
same-sex marriages, at least regarding PSAs. However, even if PSAs
were applied across the board, to both same-sex and heterosexual cou-
ples, much of the potential inapplicability of PSAs to same-sex relation-
increasingly prevalent, it seems likely that a higher percentage of heterosexual couples (particularly
those who are married) have children than same-sex couples.
161. For another gay-affirmative argument favoring differential treatment of same-sex and
heterosexual couples, see Pouncy, supra note 144, at 370.
162. Baehr v. Miike, CIV. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *21 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996)
(enjoining the state from denying marriage licenses "solely because applicants are of the same sex").
While the Hawaii legislature may exercise its recently acquired power to ban same-sex marriage,
Vermont's litigation continues apace. See supra note 143.
163. HAw. REV. STAT. § 572C (Supp. 1997).
164. Peggy Lowe, Same-Sex Registrations Endorsed, DENV. POST, July 9, 1998, at BI;
GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF SAME-SEX RELATIONSIHPS,
STATE OF COLO., REPORT, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1998) (copy on file with the author).
As a member of the legal subcommittee of Governor Romer's Commission on Rights and
Responsibilities of Same-Sex Relationships, I participated in numerous spirited and nuanced debates
about optimal state regulations of same-sex relationships. Like Jane Schacter, I prefer a legal regime
which recognizes a "pluralism of affiliative structures." Schacter, supra note 80, at 1259. However,
given the gendered divisions of labor upon which PSAs rest, PSAs might be more justified under a
marriage model than within an alternative such as domestic partnership.
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ships would be mooted by the partners' ability to contract around the
PSA terms by conduct.
Finally, same-sex partners can resort to private law by contractually
creating PSAs until such time as the state recognizes same-sex relation-
ships. Courts tend to enforce same-sex relationship contracts, even when
state statutes ban same-sex marriage or criminalize same-sex sexual ac-
tivity.'" Since gay couples must contractually create most family law
rights, they (or their lawyers) could incorporate a PSA into cohabitation
agreements.'" For those couples with children, or who otherwise choose
to specialize in wage and domestic labor, such contracting makes par-
ticular sense.
One final objection to adopting PSAs in same-sex relationships sug-
gests that perhaps the gendered division of labor is not the best template
to mimic.'' But if couples are engaging in such specialization, the advis-
ability of doing so is beside the point.
CONCLUSION
Queer legal theorists should be interested in commercializing mar-
riage through Premarital Security Agreements. PSAs recognize home-
maker contributions to family wealth (specifically, primary-wage-earner
income) by making the homemaker a creditor in relation to her primary
wage-earning spouse. The amount of the wage-earner's debt could be
calculated based on the difference between the spouses' income at di-
vorce, the duration of the marriage, and the age of any minor children.
This debt would be secured by 50 percent of all marital property. In the
event of divorce, the primary homemaker, like any other secured credi-
tor, could foreclose on that collateral in order to obtain her fair share of
marital property.
In addition to deconstructing heterosexuality before, or at least con-
currently with, deconstructing marginalized sexual orientations, PSAs
queer legal doctrine governing marriage in a number of ways. First, they
undermine compulsory heterosexuality. Second, they account for gender
165. Ertman, Contractual Purgatory, supra note 74, at 1137-40 (discussing same-sex
cohabitation contracts and the remarkable case Crooke v. Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1992), in
which the Georgia Supreme Court invoked the parol evidence rle to exclue evidence that a
cohabitation contract between two women was based on "illegal and immoral" consideration). The
Florida Court of Appeals similarly enforced a same-sex cohabitation contract, reasoning that:
[E]ven though the state has prohibited same-sex marriages and same-sex adoptions, it has
not prohibited this type of agreement.... Even though no legal rights or obligations flow
as a matter of law from a non-marital relationship, we see no impediment to the parties to
such a relationship agreeing between themselves to provide certain rights and obligations.
Posik v. Layton, 695 So. 2d 759, 761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); see also Silver v. Starrett, 674
N.Y.S.2d 915, 918 (Sup. Ct. 1998) ("In non-marital breakups, the law largely leaves the post-
relationship consequences to such agreements as its parties may work out.").
166. This point also holds true for PSAs as applied to heterosexual couples. See Ertman,
Commercializing Marriage, supra note 4, at 110.
167. See supra text accompanying note 79.
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performativity and strategic provisionality. Third, they queer the state by
using liberal constructs toward radical ends. Fourth, they intervene in
legal conflations of sex, gender, and sexual orientation. Finally, by
changing the focus of marriage doctrine from sex, gender, and sexual
orientation to economics, PSAs could contribute to a social climate
which recognizes same-sex marriage. Queer theorists could object to
PSAs on the ground that PSAs could unintentionally support traditional
gender roles or further marginalize poor people and/or many people of
color, but the benefits of experimenting with divorce reform (and recon-
structing marriage) outweigh inevitable risks that the reform might have
unintended consequences.
As a doctrinal tool to implement some of the most radical insights
of queer theory, PSAs have the potential to be both effective and trans-
formative. But even if they do not achieve everything suggested in this
essay, they could contribute to other, perhaps more effective and/or more
transformative, measures changing the law of heterosexual marriage. The
question is not whether PSAs resolve all the issues raised by queer legal
theory, but rather whether we can afford not to seriously consider PSAs
or other proposed reforms of marriage law.'"
168. Duggan, supra note 2, at 193 ("The question is: At this historical moment, can we
transform any liberal rhetoric in the interests ultimately of going beyond liberal categories and
solutions? Or, given the difficulty or translating our most radical insights and arguments into
effective public discourse, can we afford not to try?").
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